SUMMARY

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Application to have section 98(4) of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act no.40 of 2008 declared unconstitutional for violating section 12 of the Constitution, in that it permits the concurrent running of criminal and civil proceedings in respect of the same property seized in terms of it- she had argued that, given this scenario, it forces her to disclose her defence in civil proceedings thereby  forcing her to waive her right to self-incrimination with the consequence that her pending criminal trial is prejudiced- Held, this section does not force an applicant faced with forfeiture application to incriminate herself, what it rather does is to leave her with the choice between leaving forfeiture application go unchallenged and substantively responding to it, held that for this reason, this section is constitutional.

-The applicant had further sought to have a three-year delay to charge her with criminal offences following her suspension from work, violated her right to be tried within a reasonable time in terms of section 12 of the Constitution, Held, pre-charge delay in preferring charges not protected by the right to speedy trial a provided under section 12 of the Constitution, the reckoning of time within which a person must be tried starts after charges have been read  not before.

Summary

Constitutional rights - right to fair trial and right to equal protection of the law - applicant convicted and sentenced by Magistrate Court - challenged both conviction and sentence on review - failure by a Judge to render a reserved judgement until sentence served in full - its effect on fair trial rights and protection of the law - Judicial immunity  - whether the omission gives rise to a claim for damages under section 22 of the Constitution.

Summary

Diplomats based in South Africa - differently salaried from diplomats in other missions-challenge on the differentiation on constitutional grounds - whether approach appropriate where a complaint may adequately be addressed under Administrative Law

Exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 22 of the Constitution - principles guiding the excise of discretion under this provision restated - Court declines jurisdiction.

SUMMARY

Constitutional law – appointment of a principal secretary contrary to section 139(1) of the Constitution – whether such appointment valid. Whether appellant was appointed by the new Prime Minister.

Held: there was no valid appointment and appeal dismissed with costs.

SUMMARY

Constitutional law – claim for renewal of fixed term contracts or alternatively, declarator that failure to renew contracts violates rights to property in the form of salary – fixed term contracts having expired automatically – clauses in contracts stipulating that resolution of disputes thereof to be made in accordance with the Labour Code – whether the claims implicate violation of the Bill of Rights – reliance on section 12 (8) and doctrine of legitimate expectation – no basis found to have been  established for exercise of constitutional jurisdiction and reliance on doctrine of legitimate expectation – Constitution 1993, section 12 (8); Government Proceedings and Contracts Act, 1965 section 5; Public Service Act, 2005 section 7; Public Service Regulations, 2008 regulation 20.

Constitutional litigation – Request to Subordinate Court for reference of a substantial  question of law as to the interpretation of the constitution to the High Court –  Section 128 of the Constitution – Request to Subordinate Court for reference of a question as to the contravening of the provisions of section 4 to 21 (inclusive) of the Constitution to the High Court pursuant to section 22(3) - Whether our Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to review refusal of such requests – Grounds for review of decisions and/or proceedings of subordinate courts - Whether provisions of the Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offences Act creating new statutory offences and regulating their prosecution oust the Director of Public Prosecution’s constitutional competence to prosecute said offences without the involvement of the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Offences – Whether the Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offences Act gives the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Offences exclusive authority to investigate offences created by the said Act and takes away the constitutional authority of the police to initiate and conduct such investigations.

Constitutional Law – Locus standi in judicio of a political party to institute a constitutional application in respect of the appointment of Judges of the High Court – When is a decision of the Judicial Service Commission made in the absence of any member valid – Interpretation of section 132(10) of Constitution and rule 5(2) of the JSC Rules

Intersection between s 20 and s66 (4) of the Lesotho Constitution, whether a civil society organisation entitled to participate in the selection of members of the Independent Electoral Commission.  Held that it was not.

Constitutional Law- Discrimination- whether the two categories of Secretaries had the same status- Executive Secretaries being permanent and pensionable staff- Ministerial secretaries being contract staff whose contracts are terminable by the termination of a Minister’s position or regime change- whether differential treatment comes to this Court with a sense of Constitutional invalidity- the test is identification of objectively determinable characteristics of the difference in conditions of service.

Constitution of Lesotho 1993 - Supremacy of – under its section 2 – Lesotho is a dualist state under international law. Any treaty, protocol or any political inter partes agreement in order to be enforceable in Lesotho must be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution of Lesotho – Noble motives are not relevant in considering enactment, a treaty, protocol or inter partes agreement cannot be elevated to a status of law without emasculating the authority and supremacy of the Constitution.

Where political leaders sign a Memorandum of understanding (MOU) without enactment of such by parliament of Lesotho, such MOU cannot be elevated to a status of law.  It rests solely on good faith of the parties to the agreement.

Where Clause 10 of MOU signed by a Representative of Government of Lesotho and a Leader of the Opposition has a salutary effect of restraining or hamstringing the powers and discretion of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) under Section 99 (1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution to institute criminal proceedings against any person, such clause 10 of the MOU – its noble motive to facilitate the ongoing reform process in Lesotho notwithstanding – it must pass the muster of consistency as provided by Sections 2 (The Supremacy of the Constitution clause)  and 99 of the Constitution.

All International Instruments are founded on good faith and honesty.  Courts cannot, while noting their essential importance, enforce good faith as if it is a law.  Courts are Courts of law and not of equity or political expediency.  It would fail to make a judicial sense to declare clause 10 (inelegantly drafted as it is) as being consistent with the stated provisions of the Constitution.  Coined by a French jurist Montesquieu “The Spirit of the Law” in the 18th Century, the doctrine of Separation of Powers restrains or insulates the Court of law from entering the “turf” of state policy or influencing matters of importance such as the ongoing Reform process so vital to the peace and stability of our Kingdom.  This Court’s decision should not be interpreted as “breaking” or dislocating the reform process now on going in Lesotho.

As a unitary state, all three main organs of state – Legislature, Executive and Judiciary must operate in unison and never at cross-purposes. Finally, the Court held as follows:

1. The Applicants had a direct and substantial interest in the matter and ought to have been joined and consequently the relief for their intervention is granted;
2. The MOU is not a SADC Agreement or Treaty with Lesotho and international law is not applicable over it;
3. Assuming that the MOU was a Treaty, it would not spontaneously create enforceable rights and obligations in a dualistic Lesotho where this could only be so upon the domestication of any instrument of international law through an Act of Parliament;
4. Clause 10 of the MOU, remains unconstitutional as it has already pronounced itself in the previous consolidated cases since it undermines the powers of the DPP under Section 99 of the Constitution, Section 1 (1) of same which makes Lesotho a sovereign democratic State and Section 2 which renders the Constitution to be the supreme law of the Kingdom.