IN
THE LABOUR COURT OF LESOTHO

CASE
NO LC 47/97

HELD
AT MASERU

IN
THE MATTER OF:

MAMOHLAKOLA
LETSATSI (DULY Assisted by her husband) APPLICANT

AND

J.D.
GROUP LTD t/a SCORE 1 FURNISHERS RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

The
applicant herein was dismissed on the 15^th
August 1995, following a disciplinary hearing. She however, says she
was verbally told of the dismissal. No dismissal letter
was ever
issued until this day she avers. She launched these proceedings on
the 12^th
May 1997, approximately two years after the dismissal. In paragraph
3(h) of the Originating Application the applicant sought to
make an
application for condonation of her late filing of the Originating
Application as follows:

“Applicant
submits that her claim after the prescribed time(sic) be condoned
because from April 1996(sic) to March 1997 respondent’s
official
refused and/or neglected to produce any letter of dismissal nor the
record of proceedings.”

In
their Answer the respondents took a point in limine that the matter
is prescribed and that the applicant has failed to make a
condonation
application in terms of rule 30 of the rules of the court. At the
first hearing on the 16^th
March 1999 counsels for the parties appeared before the late Mapetla
ad hoc President as he then was and agreed that the matter
be
postponed to enable the applicant to formally answer the respondents’
preliminary point. The matter was postponed to the
12^th
April 1999, when it was again postponed to enable Mr. Maieane for the
applicant to file a proper condonation application. The
matter was
thereafter postponed on another two occasions it still being to
enable applicant’s counsel to file a condonation application
in
accordance with rule 30 of the Rules of the Court.

The
condonation application was finally filed on the 30^th
March 2000. It was argued on the 4^th
December 2001. We must record that this application is referred to
as a condonation application because that is what its front
page
styles it. Substantively it is no condonation application at all.
It is infact a reply to the respondent’s point in limine
that the
matter is prescribed. Both in the founding affidavit and in argument
before court the applicant’s contention is that
prescription has
not started to run because she has not been given a letter of
dismissal. She contends that prescription as contemplated
by the law
would start to run from the date she is served with the letter of
dismissal.

The
respondents contend that the applicant was issued with a letter of
termination which was presented with the disciplinary action
form and
asked to sign the form which informed her that she is summarily
dismissed but she refused to sign. Indeed Annexure “A”
to the
Originating Application is the Disciplinary Action Form referred to.
The form shows that the action taken against the applicant
is
dismissal. At the bottom of the page is a space for the signatures
of the chairman, the employee and the representative. Only
the
chairman has signed. On the space reserved for the signature of the
employee is written by hand “did not want to sign.”
At the very
end of the page the following minute is recorded; “employee’s
signature confirm that he/she has received this
FORM whether or not
he/she agrees with such action.” Clearly therefore, the applicant
has denied herself the chance to get the
letter she alleges the
respondent’s officers have not given her.

In
any event it is important to note that the Code speaks of a “written
statement.” (see section 69(1) of the Code). Nowhere
does it
refer to a letter. In our view that statement can take different
forms including, the disciplinary action form the applicant
refused
to sign. Furthermore, it is significant that the applicant has
annexed this form to her Originating Application. This
conflicts
with her averment that she has not been furnished with the letter and
the record of disciplinary action. She has not
even explained when
and how she secured these records. We can as well conclude that she
has had them for quite a while, but because
she expected to be
written a letter decided to wait until the letter is written. We
find no basis in law or in contract for that
expectation.

Assuming
that it was true that the applicant had no written notification of
the dismissal, it seems to us that even then that would
be no excuse
for the applicant to have not filed her claim timeously in terms of
the law. Applicant admits that she was verbally
informed that she
was dismissed on the 15^th
August 1995. There is nothing either in the law or in her contract
of employment to support the contention that the dismissal
is not
effective until a letter to that effect is issued. In our view the
verbal information effectively terminated the contract
and the
prescription started to run from that day in terms of section 70(1)
of the Code. Accordingly, we are in agreement with
the respondents
that this matter is time barred. The respondents’ point in limine
is therefore upheld. There is no order as
to costs.

THUS
DONE AT MASERU THIS 12TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2001.

L.A
LETHOBANE

PRESIDENT

C.T.
POOPA

MEMBER I
AGREE

P.K.
LEROTHOLI

MEMBER I
AGREE

FOR
APPLICANT : MR KULUNDU

FOR
RESPONDENTS: MR. MOLETE