CIV/T/273/85
IN THE HIGH COURT OF LESOTHO
In the matter of :
MPITI TAOLE Plaintiff
V
G.O. DWAMENA Defendant
JUDGMENT
Delivered by the Hon. Acting Mr. Justice D.S, Levy on the 6th November, 1985.
In this matter Plaintiff whose claim is for ejectment of the Defendant from certain premises and payment of arrear rentals amounting to M3,000 takes exception to the Defendant's plea that it does not disclose a defence.
The admitted allegations made by the Plaintiff are as follows :
The Plaintiff is the lawful owner and occupier of site 619 Hillsview.
The Defendant was called upon by Lesotho Building Finance Corporation. (L.B.F.C.) to. vacate the premises.
The Defendant was informed by L.B.F.C. "that it had decided to hand over its rights and obligations under (an agreement of lease between L.B.F.C. and certain AGTEC (Pty) Ltd)" (AGTEC).
The Defendant is in occupation of the premises..
The Defendant did not deny a further allegation by the Plaintiff that this agreement of lease has expired
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and is therefore presumed to have admitted it.
The remaining allegations made by the Plaintiff having been denied, or not having been admitted, by the Defendant the issues that arise between the parties on the pleadings are :
Whether L.B.F.C. acted as agent for the Plaintiff in entering into a written agreement of lease of the premises of which the Plaintiff is in occupation.
Whether such lease was for a period of 24 months.
Whether the Plaintiff leased the premises to AGTEC in terms of a written agreement or whether Plaintiff leased the premises to
a certain Peacock Garment Company (Pty) Ltd (Peacock) in terms of an oral agreement as alleged by the Defendant.
Whether such oral agreement is for an indefinite period.
The gist of the Defendant's version of the agreement of lease to be culled from the pleadings is that Defendant claims that his right of occupation arises out of an oral agreement for the lease of these premises to Peacock by Plaintiff for an indefinite period and that he does not derive his right from any agreement of lease between Plaintiff and AGTEC which may or may not have expired.
On this analysis of the pleadings it is apparent that the Defendant's plea does disclose a defence to the action for ejectment. It further discloses the defence that Peacock and not the Plaintiff (who is its managing director) is liable for the rent due under the lease since he is not a party to it nor is he in unlawful occupation (and so liable for damages) until the
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lease has been lawfully terminated by notice duly given. The allegation by the Plaintiff that he told the Defendant to vacate the premises does not amount to such a notice.
The Plaintiff's further exception to the plea is that the lease between Plaintiff and Peacock on which he relies for his right to remain in occupation was alleged by him to be timeless in its duration and so is a nullity under the provisions of section 26 of the Deeds Registry Act 12 of 1967. I am of the view that the word 'timeless' as used by the Defendant to describe the lease was not intended to convey the allegation that the lease was for ever but merely to allege that no period was fixed for its duration so that it would amount to no more than a monthly tenancy.
The exceptions accordingly are dismissed with costs.
D.S. Levy
ACTING JUDGE.
6th November, 1985.
For the Plaintiff : Mr. Pheko
For the Defendant : Mr. Gwentshe.