CIV/T/581/83

IN THE
HIGH COURT OF LESOTHO

In the
matter between

EDWIN
RALIOTLO PHAKISI Plaintiff

and

SOLICITOR
GENERAL 1st Defendant

SECOND
LIEUTENANT TSITA 2nd Defendant

JUDGMENT

Delivered
by the Hon Acting Mr. Justice. D S Levy on the 21st day of
August,1985

The
events with which this action is concerned took place at Mokhotlong
in the Maluti Mountains of Lesotho where the Plaintiff carries
on
business as a general dealer, a cafe proprietor and a transport
contractor.

At about
6 a.m on 13th August, 1983, the Second Defendant, who holds the rank
of Second Lieutenant in Lesotho Mounted Police, Security
Branch,
appeared at Plaintiff's home in Mokhotlong in the company of about
ten policemen. Second Defendant informed Plaintiff that
he was under
arrest for security reasons and proceeded to search his residence and
business premises. Nothing of any consequence
was found but the
police seized the Plaintiff's licensed firearm and ammunition.

The
police also took possession of Plaintiff's Mercedes Benz truck and
his Toyota Landcruiser and, with the keys supplied by Plaintiff,

these vehicles were driven by policemen to the local police station
The Plaintiff himself was escorted to the same police station
where,
he says, his shoes were removed and he was confined in a bare cell
and where he was kept all day with no food water and
no bed

At about
9 p m.,says Plaintiff, he was taken from the cell by a police officer
and walked with his head covered with a blanket and
with his hands
handcuffed behind

2/ his
back to ......

-2-

his back
to the security office The Plaintiff says that when the police came
to his cell, he put on his underpants, trousers, vest,
shirt, jersey,
socks and shoes but once he had arrived in the security office, he
was made to undress so that he stood stark naked
in the presence of
the police officers who were there and with his hands which had been
unhandcuffed to allow him to undress once
again handcuffed behind his
back.

Plaintiff
says that he was interrogated by Second Defendant and Second
Lieutenant Molapo only, although the office was full of policemen
The
subject of the interroga­tion was the identity of people said to
have been conveyed by Plaintiff in his vehicle (which
one was not
stated by the police) to Madubadube on 1st July, 1983. Plaintiff says
that it was put to him by Second Defendant that
there had been a
skirmish between the police and insurgents at Makhoaba in which a
number of insurgents and police officers and
civilians had been
killed. The gist of the allegation was that the Plaintiff had
conveyed these in­surgents to Madubadube at
that time.

The
Plaintiff denied that he had taken part in the conveyance of
insurgents and the Second Defendant then said that he would deal
with
the Plaintiff in a police way so that he, the Plaintiff, would tell
the truth.

The
Plaintiff then described how the police set about him

1. By
   applying electric shocks to him by connecting a jump starter to a
   wall plug and frequently applying the distant ends to his
   right and
   left thighs for a period of about twenty minutes

   
   

2. By
   pulling his penis from side to side.

   
   

3. By
   kicking him with their booted feet on the legs and up to the waist.

   
   

4. By
   punching him on the head so that

   
   

he fell to the ground and then booting him all over his body.

3

5. By
   covering his head down to his waist with a canvas bag and fastening
   the mouth of the bag so that the air in the bag soon became

   exhausted and he suffocated until he collapsed, and then repeating
   the process after he had recovered. When he collapsed again,
   he was
   carried outside, still hand­cuffed and naked, where he found
   himself when he recovered consciousness.

   
   

The
Plaintiff says that he was frequently admonished throughout this
torture to speak the truth and asked if he wanted to die. After
an
hour or so, he was taken back to his cell after dressing but after
being deprived or his underpants, vest, socks and shoes His

jersey,overcoat and blanket were also given back to him.

When he
was taken back to his cell, said the Plaintiff his hands were
handcuffed in front and he was told by Malonya, a police officer,
to
think it over.

The
Plaintiff said that he was tortured in the same way the next night
and every night thereafter, until his release on 7th September,
and
additionally he was forced at times to stand on some hot object which
he could not identify

The
Plaintiff said that at times he was given food but not before lunch
time on Monday for the first time although he was arrested
on the
previous Saturday morning and kept without any food or water at all
until than.

He said
that on one occasion, for four successive days, he was kept without
any food or water and otherwise ho received a thick
slice of bread
and a glass of oros water in the morning and in the evening and at
times a bottle of water to drink. He said that
he got no toilet paper
or blankets and he remained handcuffed in front tnroughout his entire
detention by the security police who
kept him alone in a cell at the
Magistrate's Court near to the police station

On 7th
September, the Plaintiff was taken before a magistrate and remanded
on a charge under the Security

4

Legislation
Plaintiff said that he complained to the magistrate that he had been
assaulted by the police and that he was ill from
the assaults

The
Plaintiff was remanded in custody in prison and he complained to the
prison officials who examined his in­juries and who
wrote down
whet they observed.

The
Plaintiff was also examined by a doctor on 9th September at which
time Plaintiff was unable to walk and was conveyed to the
doctor in
an ambulance. The doctor prescribed a rubbing medicine for his
swollen feet and for contractions of the calf muscles,
and some
tablets.

Plaintiff's
truck was released to him on 29th august when he was taken from his
cell to satisfy himself as to the condition of the
truck on its being
handed over to his driver.

Out of
these events, arise the Plaintiff's claims for damages for assault in
the amount for R15,032,50 and for damages for wrongful
seizure of his
vehicle in an amount of R18,360,00 being for loss of earnings
occasioned to him thereby

Particulars
of the nature of the assault alleged by the Plaintiff were sought by
Defendants and were refused by Plaintiff

The same
request was made at the pre-trial conference the minute of which
records that the nature of the assault was explained in
the medical
report which is self-explana­tory

The
medical report referred to is Exhibit "A". This document is
dated 15th September, 1983 and was drawn up by a Dr. Klose
who is no
longer in Lesotho and who did not give evidence at this trial The
report reads"Medical Findings on Examination Chest
Residue of
subsidiary bruises arms/hands healed scratches both hands,
marks/scars

5

both wrists.

Legs

Healing ulcerations both thighs (1 cm diameter) Healed abrasions left
lower legs "

The report continues that the Plaintiff "reported to have been
in handcuffs for the period 13th August, 1983 and 7th September,
1983
and to have been tortured with electric current applied to his
thighs. He also reported weakness and pain in both legs especially
of
the calves and that his private parts had been twisted "

There is
no mention of any complaint in the report of kicks or blows or of
suffocation or of a low diet or of standing on a hot
object.

During
the course of cross-examination of the Plaintiff on the 7th May.
1985, the Plaintiff stated that

the plug
to which the jump starter was attached for the pur­pose of
applying electric shocks to him was low down on the wall
and on the
right of the office door, and it was police officers, Molapo and
Moholi, who applied the shocks to him

It was
put to Plaintiff that there was no wall plug at all in that room, in
consequence of which the parties made immediate arrangements
for an
inspection of the secu­rity office at the Mokhotlony Police
Station.

On 16th
July, 1985, a Mr. Leech gave evidence that in the presence of the
parties and/or their representatives, he examined the
electric
installation in the office in question and found no signs at all of
any plug or of any previous electrical installation
other than the
one fluo­rescent light connected to an electric cable in a steel
conduit with a fifteen year old switch box,
the knock out parts of
which were both still solid, that is, showing that no other leads had
been taken from this switch box, at
any rate

Two other
accused appeared with the Plaintiff at his trial on the charges of
subversive activities and all three were acquitted
Both these other
accused gave evi­dence at this trial They were Moloantoa who said

6

that he
was arrested on 19th August, 1983 and kept in solitary custody at the
Mokhotlong Police Station cells until 7th September,
during which
time was interrogated by the Second Defendant and other policemen,
who all assaulted him by hitting him on the head
after covering it
with a blanket, by pulling his penis and by pricking him with pins on
the buttocks He also said that he was kept
handcuffed all this time
and that he was further assaulted by the police by rubbing him on his
bare feet with their booted feet.
He was also given two slices of
bread and Oros water per day and on some days, no food or water at
all

He says
that when he was remanded by a magistrate on 7th September, he made
no complaint for fear of further assaults

When he
met Plaintiff in prison on 7th September, Plaintiff was unable to
walk and had wounds on his wrists and thighs. He also
observed long
fresh scars on Plaintiff's buttocks and thighs.

Mokotsela
was Plaintiff's driver and was his second co-accused at the trial.
His evidence was to the effect that he had been arrested
on the same
charges and was kept handcuffed all the time and kept alone in his
cell at the prison He complained of assaults by
being kicked and
beate with the butts of firearms on the chest. He said too, that his
penis was kicked and pulled.

He told
of sticks being placed under his knees and his arm and wrists locked
over the stick with handcuffs and that he was kept
trussed in this
fashion, sometimes the whole night, in the interrogation room.

He said
that at all meals he got a slice of bread only and for one week he
got no meals at all.

The
purpose of this evidence presumably was to show similar conduct on
the part of the police in their treat­ment of other detainees.
At
any rate, no objection was made to this evidence. Such evidence of
"similar facts" is admissible if it is "logically

relevant in determining the matter in issue".

7

Per
Nicholas J in Omega v. African Textile 1982(1)

951 at
955 T. In this case, the relevance of the evidence of Plaintiff's
co-accused is that the Second Defendant in their case did
not scruple
himself or to allow other police, men under his command to use
violence in the course of their interrogation of the
Plaintiff's
co-accused and so presumably would be likely to do as much again to
the Plaintiff himself for the same purpose.

The
evidence of the Defendants' witnesses presents a very different
picture to the one painted by the Plaintiff of unbridled torture
and
the merciless infliction of pain on the Plaintiff in a number of ways
including solitary confinement and semi-starvation.

But the
Defendants' witnesses all acknowledged that the Plaintiff was kept
handcuffed in his cell, day and night, although these
handcuffs were
removed when he was interro­gated Their answer to this aspect is
that the Plaintiff, by his conduct in the cell,
presented a threat of
an escape, that other detainees had in the past escaped from the cell
and that the handcuffs were used to
restrain him from any possibility
of escape. It was also suggested that he was being violent in the
cell and that the handcuffs
also served to restrain him from injuring
himself.

The
conduct of the Plaintiff which induced this belief in the Second
Defendant was that the Plaintiff would shout to be freed from
his
cell, that he frequently banged the door of the cell and pulled at
the bars of the cell window There was no evidence that he,
in any
way, damaged the door or the window bars or that such conduct could
force the door or window.

The
Plaintiff exhibited the marks on his wrists caused by the handcuffs
which examination showed (they were standard police handcuffs)

present a sharp edge to the wrist. The prison officials also recorded
that his wrists on 8th September, 1983 showed handcuff marks

consisting of small wounds

The
Plaintiff was detained under the provisions of the Internal Security
(General) Act 1983 Section 40(4) of that

8

Act 1983
Section 40(4) of that Act provides that such a detainee shall be
subject to the provisions of the Prison Rules 1957 relating
to
untried prisoners Section 47(1) of the Prison Rules of 1957 provides,
in summary form, that mechanical restraints shall not
be used as a
punishment or for any purpose other than safe custody during removal,
or when it appears necessary to do so in order
to prevent the
prisoner from injuring himself or damaging property or creating a
disturbance, and shall not continue for longer
than twenty-four hours
unless otherwise ordered in writing by the officer in charge giving
reasons and specifying the period for
which the prisoner is to be
kept under such mechanical restraint

I have no
doubt that handcuffs are a form of mechanical restraint and I
consider that to keep the Plaintiff in hand­cuffs for

twenty-eight days despite being locked in solitary confinement in his
cell and even though released for one to two hours per day
to attend
to his toilet or to be inter­rogated is such unusual and cruel
treatment as to merit the description of torture

I cannot
accept that banging at the door of his cell or rattling the window
bars or shouting to be released would in any way be
restrained by
handcuffs so that, at best, it was a useless exercise in restraint.
Nor indeed do the rules suggest that restraints
can be used to
prevent escape from a cell except perhaps to prevent physical damage
to property.

The marks
on Plaintiff's wrists are cogent evidence of his suffering under this
handcuffing, and the physical and mental inhibitions
imposed on him
by it can only have been the cause of severe pain and anguish.

The
conduct relied upon by the Defendants in justi­fication can, at
best,have been only of a sporadic nature and of desultory
occurrence.
Some tolerance also should have been shown towards a detainee whose
detention in solitary confinement and on a spartan
diet can only have
been trying in extreme

9

I can
find no justification for the conduct of the police in keeping the
Plaintiff in handcuffs.

I turn
now to the other assaults alleged by the Plaintiff, the first of
which is the allegation that electric shocks were administered
to
him.

In
weighing the evidence of the Plaintiff, I must exclude the
corroboration that is contained in the report of Dr. Klose in
Exhibit"A".
He was not called as a witness and was said to
be overseas and so was unavailable. His report contains the
expression of his opinion
that the healing ulcers on Plaintiff's
thighs were the marks of power burns. In the absence of an
opportunity to the Defen­dants
for cross-examination of Or Klose,
there is no reason why his written statement of his opinion should be
admissible in evidence
and I exclude it.

However,
this statement was delivered to the Defendants as the Plaintiff's
Particulars for Trial of the nature of the assaults committed
on the
Plaintiff and to that extent it remains a part of the pleadings in
this case.

I turn
now to consider the credibility of the various witnesses called by
the Plaintiff and the Defendants I am unable to say that
any of these
witnesses particularly impressed me as witness whose evidence should
be accepted without hesitation even though contradicted
by other
witnes­ses.

Judged by
demeanour alone, all of them seem to be telling the truth of the
matters they spoke about to the best of their recollection
and none
of them was shifty or evasive or generally a witness whose evidence
should not be accepted. No witness was subjected to
any rigorious
cross-examination and so was not really tested on his honesty or
memory and I am finally left to the probabilities
to determine
whether the Plaintiff has discharged his onus of satisfying me on a
balance of probabilities that I should accept
his evidence and reject
the contradictory evidence of the Defendants' witnesses.

10

Of
course, if there were no probabilities at all pointing to the need to
accept the evidence of either party, then if I am unable
to satisfy
myself which party is telling the truth either as a matter of
impression of their demeanour or of the probabilities
in the case,
then the Plaintiff must fail, because, as was said by Coetzee J. in
African Eagle Life Insurance Company v. Gainer
980(2) S.A. 234 at 237
(W)

the
position then simply is that there is no proof unless one is
satisfied that one witness's evidence is true and that of the other

false

But in
this case, in addition to the evidence of the parties, several
probabilities emerge which tend to support the Defendants'
denial of
the Plaintiff's allegations These are

1. The
   Plaintiff's failure to complain to the magistrate at his remand that
   he had been subjected to electrical shocks, star­vation
   and
   suffocation and burns on the feet, although he says that he did
   com­plain to the magistrate that he had been assaulted
   and was
   ill from his assaults

   
   

2. The
   Plaintiff's failure to make any similar complaint to the prison
   authorities that is, either to the recording clerk or to the
   medical
   officer who examined him

   
   

3. The
   Plaintiff's apparent fitness for hard labour as found by the prison
   doctor dis-pite being on a diet so far below what must
   be required
   for life support, that one would expect him to have been in a state
   of collapse

   
   

4. Plaintiff's
   physical ability to attend the

   
   

handing over of his truck without any physical indication that he had
been sub­jected for about eleven days to torture and
starvation
and thirst.

5. The
   absence of any of the complaints con­cerning suffocation,
   starvation and burning of the feet in Dr. Klose's report insofar
   as
   it constitutes trial particulars of the nature of the assaults.

   
   

11

6. The
   total absence of any sign of the previous installation of a plug in
   the security office as described by the Plaintiff

   
   

I should
add, as well, that if the police officers were Dent on a conspiracy
to conceal their assaults on the Plaintiff, then it
is surprising
that they so readily admitted that he had been kept in handcuffs
throughout the total period of his imprisonment
I should also mention
that there was no attempt on their part to embellish his diet and it
was common cause that he was given only
bread and water (with Oros in
it) throughout, although of course the quantities and regularity of
supply are in sharp contention.

There is
a curious aspect of Plaintiff's evidence which I find improbable in
the extreme. He claimed that in the course of interrogation,
he lost
conciousness and came to his senses to find himself in the yard of
the police station still naked. I find it highly improbable
that the
security police having once suffocated him into a state of
unconsciousness would carry the Plaintiff, whilst still unconscious

naked out of the police station in full view of everybody and place
him in the yard to recover conscious­ness. I find Molapo's
denial
of this incident more probable than the allegation

On
Plaintiff's version of electric shocks, he received numerous electric
burns some of which he said left small bleeding wounds
some of which
have healed and others left scars. One would expect therefore his
thighs to be pitted with scars Instead there are
only the two
circular scars which he exhibited

The scars
that Plaintiff's witness, Sehloho Moloantoa, saw on Plaintiff's body
and which he described as long scars, some short
and some long, all
over his buttocks and thighs are quite different scars from anything
described by Plaintiff

12

Plaintiff
explained his inability to identify the hot object on which he was
forced to stand by saying that his eyes were covered
with something
Yet the blanket over his head was taken off when he was subjected to
elec­tric burns so that he could see the
jump starters and the
electric plug to which they were attached. It is also difficult to
accept that the Plaintiff was forced to
jump onto the hot object so
that he kept jumping off and on. This would seem to suggest a
substantial degree of co­operation
by the Plaintiff in allowing
himself to be burnt on the feet which he has never explained and
which I find highly improbable Nor
has any doctor made any record of
burns on Plaintiff's feet.

A last
improbability to which I must refer is con­tained in the curious
situation that the police were totally inconsistent
in the method of
torturing the three accused, that is Plaintiff and his two co-accused

Sehloho
said that he was hit on his head with some heavy object after his
head had been covered with a blanket and he was pricked
with pins on
the buttocks. If it was intended to prove that these pin pricks were
in fact electric shocks, then it is curious that
this witness neither
saw the jump starters nor recognised the pain as emanating from
electric shocks, nor did he suffer any burns
as testified to by
Plaintiff, nor was he suffocated.

Plaintiff's
driver, Mokotsela, was assaulted by kicks and blows from rifle butts
and handcuffed with sticks locked under his knees.
He was not
subjected to electric shocks or to suffocation or to burning.

In the
result and while the evidence of these two witnesses remains
admissible to prove a course of conduct on the part of the police
to
extract confessions or infor­mation by force, the inconsistency
in the methods used by the police in respect of each of
these three
prisoners tends to diminish the probability that any force was used
at all

13

While I
am unable therefore to say with certainty that the evidence of either
the Plaintiff or the Defendant is preferable to the
other because of
the impression made by them upon me, I find that the improbabilities
to which I have made reference above lead
me to the inevitable
con­clusion that the Plaintiff's evidence and that of his
witnesses must be rejected in the light of these
findings. I find
accordingly that the Plaintiff has failed to discharge the onus of
proof on the balance of improbabilities that
he was assaulted by the
police other than by being hand­cuffed as described above, in the
ways alleged by him in evidence or
at all

I have
already expressed my opinion on the degree of humiliation, pain and
discomfort that Plaintiff must have suffered from being
kept in
handcuffs without justi­fication over so long a period. I
consider that an adequate amount that 1 should award to the
Plaintiff
as damages on this score is M3 000.

There is
no dispute that the Second Defendant and the policemen under his
command acted as the servants of the Crown in their treatment
of the
Plaintiff and the Crown accordingly is liable jointly and severally
with the Second Defendant for such damages

It
remains now to deal with Plaintiff's further claim for loss of
profits arising from the allegedly unlawful detention of his Mercedes

8enz truck

It was
put to the Plaintiff in cross-examination, and the evidence of the
Defendants' witnesses was to the effect that they had
received
information that this vehicle had been used to convey insurgents into
Lesotho from the Republic of South Africa, to convey
insurgents to
South Africa and to convey arms from South Africa into this country

The
Defendants did not specify the particular statute upon which they
relied tor their seizure of the vehicle nor were any particulars

sought of them in that

14

regard.
Once again, as in the case of the refusal of particulars of the
nature of the assault upon the Plaintiff, lax practice has
allowed
the parties unfettered scope without notice to the other party in
regard to the evidence and the defence

However,
the Defendants have confined themselves to two defences,

1 based upon the provisions of Section 26 of the Internal Security
(General)

Act 1983. and

2 based upon the provisions of Section 52 of the Criminal Procedure
and Evidence Act 1973.

1. Section 26 empowers a member of the police force to detain a
vehicle for the purposes of searching the vehicle with the object
of
ascertaining the presence of anything as to which there are
reasonable grounds for belie­ving that it will afford evidence
of
the com­mission of an offence against a provision of the Internal
Security Act

The evidence of the Second Defendant and other police officers was
that they had received in­formation that this vehicle had
been
used for the conveyance of insurgents who were involved in the
skirmish to which reference has been made earlier and generally
to
convey insurgents and arms and ammunition

The identification of the vehicle itself would therefore afford
evidence of the commission of such an offence by the driver of
it and
by implication, the Plaintiff as owner, who may have had knowledge of
its intended unlawful use.

It is obvious as well that a search for the vehicle for finger prints
would be a likely source of evidence of the use of that vehicle
for
such a purpose, when for example the finger­prints of a known
insurgent were found on the vehicle

Objectively considered, reports of informers afford reasonable
grounds for the belief that the detention of the vehicle may afford

evidence of the commission of such an offence. The fact that the
evidence of such informers was not put before this Court cannot

invalidate the reasona­bleness of the Second Defendant's belief
He

15

had received information to this effect and he was entitled to rely
on such in­formation. Nor was he challenged on the reliability
of
his informers or of the information provided by them His expla­nation
that he could not use the informers' evidence at the
prosecution of
the Plain­tiff for fear of disclosing their identity and because
they lived in the Republic of Sough Africa
is acceptable. The failure
to call such evidence accordingly does not vi­tiate the
reasonableness of the Second Defendant's
belief that the vehicle had
been so used. Nor does it have to be based upon evidence admissible
in a court of law nor need such
evidence amount to prima facie proof
of the commission of an offence. cf. Duncan v. Minister of Law and
Order 1984(3) 450 @ 465
T

2 Section 52 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act empowers a
policeman who seizes any article which on reasonable grounds
is
believed to be concerned in the commission of an offence or which may
afford evidence of the commission of an offence. to retain
such
article in police custody. The word "article" is defined by
the Oxford Dictionary to have the meaning "a piece
of goods or
property". Nor is there any limi­tation imposed upon the
meaning of the word by the eiusdem generis rule as
was the case in
Bhubezi Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v. Minister of Justice 1965(1) SA 218 T.
And S v Nkepano 1973(1) 331 (0).

Although
at first reading one would be inclined to the view that Section 52
deals only with the disposal of articles seized under
Section 46 -51,
Section 52 in fact enlarges the powers con­tained in Sections 46
– 51

1. By
   extending the offences for which a thing may be seized to include
   offences committed outside Lesotho.

   
   

2. By
   extending the things which may be seized to include articles which
   include vehicles, whilst Sections 46 - 50 do not apply to
   vehicles

   
   

3. Section
   51 which does apply to vehicles, limits the offences con­cerned
   to Part I of the Second Schedule which specifies offences
   such as
   unlawful dealing in drugs, etc

   
   

16

I am
satisfied therefore that Section 52 contains the authority to a
policeman to seize and detain a vehicle in the circumstances
of the
present case.

Insofar
as damages are concerned, the Plaintiff based his case entirely upon
the allegation that by the seizure of the vehicle,
he lost the
rentals which he would have obtained for the hire of the vehicle to
the building con­tractor who was building his
house for him

He said
that he hired the vehicle to the contractor at R90,00 per trip and
that the truck would have done so many trips per day
during the
period that it was in police custody

The
evidence, however, of the contractor himself which Plaintiff did not
challenge and who was called by the Defendants, was that
in terms of
his contract with the Plaintiff, Plaintiff was obliged to supply and
deliver on site all materials for building of
the house, and for this
purpose. Plaintiff used the truck in question to bring materials to
the building site Moreover, said the
contrac­tor, the house was
almost complete at the time of Plaintiff's detention and very little
remained to be done. Such materials
he said, as were required, were
brought to the site by members of the Plaintiff's family using other
vehicles

The
Plaintiff has pinned his case for damages to the loss of profits made
on a specific contract which, it turns out, and on this
score I
reject the Plaintiff's evidence in toto, brought no profit or reward
at all to the Plaintiff. In the result, I have no
evidence before me
of Plaintiff's loss of profits or of the need to hire any other
vehicle to replace the Mercedes Benz even if
only from day bo day or
of the cost of such hire In these circumstances, 1 would be obliged
to find that the Plaintiff has not
proved his damages even if the
vehicle had been seized and detained unlawfully

The
Plaintiff has succeeded on his claim for damages

17

for
assault and has failed on the claim for damages for the deprivation
of his vehicle It is true that the Plaintiff has proved
only one
assault of the many alleged by him but nevertheless I think it would
be fair between the parties if I allowed the Plaintiff
one-half of
his taxed costs

There
will be judgment for the Plaintiff for M3,000.00 against the
Defendants jointly and severally and they are also ordered to
pay
one-half of the Plaintiff's taxed costs of the whole action.

Sgd D S
LEVY

ACTING
JUDGE

21st
August, 1985

For
Plaintiff Mr Pheko,

For
Defendant Mr Muguluma