CRI/A/13/84
IN THE HIGH COURT OF LESOTHO
In the Appeal of :
ALBERT NTESO Appellant
v
REX Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Filed by the Hon. Acting Mr. Justice J.L. Kheola on the 14th day of January, 1985.
After hearing Mr. Tsotsi. for the appellant, and Mr. Seholoholo, for the Crown, I allowed the appeal and intimated that reasons for judgment would follow later. These now follow.
The appellant who was charged with and convicted of (a) robbery and (b) attempted murder appeals to this Court against conviction only. He had been jointly charged with two other people who were found not guilty and discharged. He was sentenced to four years' imprisonment on each count and the sentences were to run concurrently.
There is no doubt that on the afternoon of the 28th October 1981, K. Nolan's shop at Corn Exchange was attacked by three robbers; money totalling R12,464-05, three blankets and three watches were seized by the robbers. As they left the shop in their combi, the robbers fired indiscriminately with their pistols at the group of school children who were standing near the road. One of the children, 'Malefu Lena (P.W.5) was hit on the right thigh by a bullet fired by one of the robbers. There is no doubt that by shooting indiscriminately and recklessly at a group of school children, the robbers had the intention to kill and thus committed the offence of attempted murder.
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The appeal is based on the ground that the trial court erred in relying on the unsatisfactory evidence of identification of a single witness (P.W.1) which shows that :
the appellant was a complete stranger to him,
at the relevant time P.W.1's attention was concentrated on "the man in grey suit" who was not the appellant,
the shop in which they were was closed and a bit dark as windows were not big enough to allow more light into the shop,
P.W.1 feared for his life,
he was ordered to lie down with his face on the floor.
I shall now give a short summary of the evidence of Motsarapane Moroa (P.W.1) who is the manager of the shop. On the afternoon in question, he was returning to the shop after lunch when he noticed that a man in a grey suit was following him. When he entered into the shop, a combi arrived at the shop and two men alighted from it. The three men followed him into the shop. As soon as they entered into the shop the two men from the combi closed the door and ordered all the people in the shop to lie down with their faces on the floor. The man in the grey suit then pointed a gun at P.W.1 and ordered him to go behind the counter and to hide his face. He complied. The man pulled the safe keys from P.W.1's pockets and opened the safe. He took all the money in the safe and gave it to one of the men who were still standing at the door. He (P.W.1) heard that the man in the grey suit was collecting money from the tills and instructing the two men to take as many blankets as they could. He again heard that they were opening the cabinet in which watches were kept. He came out of the hiding place only when he heard them slam the door. He ordered all the customers to get out of the shop. P.W.1 said that although he was frightened when the man pointed a gun at him, he saw him well and could identify him,
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He went on to say that the light in the shop was not very good because the windows were small. He admitted that the appellant was not the man who was in grey suit but he was one of the men who were at the door most of the time.
At the identification parade held at Teba on the 28th October, 1981, P.W.1 identified the appellant as one of the robbers who were standing at the door during the robbery. In cases of this nature, it has often been stressed that the patent honesty, sincerity and conviction of the identifying witness that the accused is the person he saw commit the offence should not be taken as conclusive, in addition to that the Court must find out whether or not the evidence is reliable in the sense that the witness had a proper opportunity in the circumstances of the case to carry out such observation as would be reasonably required to ensure a correct identification (R.v. Mokoena, 1958(2) S.A. 212). The factors that have to be taken into account were given by Williamson, J.A. in S. v. Mahlape, 1963(2) S.A. 29 at p. 32 where he said :
"The nature of the opportunity of observation which may be required to confer on an identification in any particular case the stamp of reliability, depends upon a great variety of factors or combination of factors, for instance the period of observation, or the proximity of the persons, or the visibility, or the state of the light, or the angle of the obervation, or prior opportunity or opportunities of observation or the presence of noticeable physical or facial feature, marks or perculiarities, or the clothing or other articles such as glasses, crutches or bags, etc., connected with the person observed, and so on, may have to be investigated in order to satisfy the court in any particular case that an identification is reliable and trustworthy as distinct from being merely bona fide and honest."
In the present case P.W.1 has not only admitted that the light in the shop was poor but also that the appellant was standing some distance from him and that during the robbery his attention was concentrated on the man in grey suit who was not the appellant. He was in fear of his life
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and was hiding himself behind a counter. As a conclusive proof that P.W.1 did not have a proper opportunity of observing the robbers, he said while he was hiding behind the counter, he heard (not saw) when they opened the cabinet in which the watches wore kept and when they took money from the tills. He also heard when they slammed the door. There is no doubt that the trial court found P.W.1 to be very honest and trustworthy. But the inquiry should have been whether the witness had a proper opportunity to observe the robbers at the door. No such investigation was made.
For the reasons stated above, I allowed the appeal.
J.L. KHEOLA.
ACTING JUDGE.
14th January, 1985.
For Appellant : Mr. Tsotsi
For Respondent : Mr. Seholoholo.