IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF LESOTHO
C OF A (CIV) NO.1 OF 1993
In the matter between :
CHIEFTAINESS 'MAMOTLOANG NKHABU Appellant
and
MINISTER OF INTERIOR 1st Respondent
CHIEF PETLANE MATSELETSELE PETLANE 2nd Respondent
ATTORNEY GENERAL 3rd Respondent
HELD AT MASERU
Coram : Mahomed, J.P.
Kotze, J.A.
Leon,.J.A.
JUDGMENT
Leon, J.A.
The appellant applied on Notice of Motion for the following order:-
Restraining the three respondents from alleging that the College of Chiefs ever made the boundary between applicants area of KOLO HA NKHABU and second respondent's area of KOLO HA PETLANE
Declaring that no agreement between the boundary committee of the College of Chiefs was ever reached and consequently no recommendation was made to His Majesty concerning the boundary.
For the time being the parties should remain occupying the areas they occupied before First Respondent on 6th
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May 1988 purported to alter the boundary.
From the terms of the order sought it is apparent to me that the basis of the application was that the boundary committee of the College of Chiefs had never reached an agreement concerning the boundary in question and that consequently no recommendation was ever made to His Majesty concerning the boundary. The other relief claimed really flows from this.
It is clear from the respondents' affidavits that the applicant's case is very much disputed. It is their case, as I shall show later, that the College of Chiefs had indeed made a decision concerning the boundary, had made a recommendation to the King who had accepted it.
At the hearing in the Court a quo Counsel for the second respondent raised a point in limine that there was an irreconcilable dispute of fact on the papers which the applicant must have foreseen and that the application accordingly fell to be dismissed. The first and third respondents abided the decision of the Court.
In upholding the preliminary point the Court held that there was a real or genuine dispute of fact on the papers which ought to have been foreseen by the applicant and that the application accordingly fell to be dismissed.
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The unsuccessful applicant has appealed to this Court on a number of grounds. One of the grounds of appeal is that if there was a genuine dispute of fact viva voce evidence should have been heard. That argument was not advanced in the Court a quo or before us. In the lower court Counsel for the appellant sought to persuade the Court that the application was brought in terms of sec. 7(a)(l) of the 1959 orders in Council and was therefore an application for review. As was correctly pointed out by the lower Court the application was for an interdict and a declarator.
I turn now to consider whether there was a real or genuine dispute of fact on the papers.
The case made by the appellant in her founding affidavit was that the First Respondent, in the bona fide belief that there had been a valid boundary determination in 1962, gave a ruling on 6 June, 1988 that the boundary dispute had been determined in 1962. In fact there had been no such determination and the first respondent who is the Minister of the Interior had apparently relied upon an unsigned document which was Annexure "B". Her case was supported by one MOKOLANE who stated that the boundary dispute had never been settled in 1962 and that the only document produced by officials of the Ministry of the Interior was an unsigned one.
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Chief Mitchell Bereng also supported the appellant's case. He alleged that the unsigned boundary recommendation never came into force. No recommendation was ever forwarded to the College of Chiefs or the King.
The allegations made by the appellant and her witnesses were hotly disputed by the respondents on the affidavits. The second respondent,
who is the Chief of Ha Petlane alleged that the appellant's allegations are not only incorrect but that she had withheld a good
deal of information. Briefly stated the salient points in his affidavit may be summarised as follows :-
The dispute over the boundary goes back to 1958. It was between the appellant's husband and predecessor and the second respondent. It was heard by Chieftainess Bereng and resolved in favour of the second respondent on 14 November 1958. In consequence boundary marks were placed.
The appellant's predecessor then failed in Court proceedings and on appeal in 1960 and 1961.
In 1964 the Standing College of Chiefs recommended to His Majesty that the appellant's predecessor's case should be dismissed and His Majesty accepted the recommendation.
The second respondent also alleges that while all these disputes were raging the appellant as the wife of the Chief was present and was well aware of them. As I read the appellant's replying affidavit she does not deny this. It follows that when she launched the application she must have been aware that a serious dispute of fact would arise on the papers.
In his affidavit the first respondent by way of background refers to the ongoing dispute over the boundary since 1968. This
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led to disturbances, a number of deaths and cases of arson in 1987 causing the Minister to make a further ruling in favour of the Chief of Petlane. The Minister alleges that :-
the boundary dispute was indeed settled. In particular he points out that the unsigned Annexure "B" relied upon by the
appellant is not the true copy of the 1964 decision. He puts up the true copy which is signed and which was a decision of the Standing College of Chiefs on 2 November 1964.
On 6 June 1988 the Minister made a further ruling in favour of the second respondent. A translation of that ruling appears as Annexure "0" to the affidavit at pages 52,and 53 of the papers. In the second paragraph on-page"53 it is stated that the College of Chiefs did indeed decide upon and determine the boundary and that that decision was confirmed by His Majesty the King.
To sum up the respondents' case :-
The boundary was determined by the College of Chiefs and confirmed by the King.
The determination was never accepted by the appellant and her predecessor and the dispute raged on.
There is clearly a dispute of fact which cannot be resolved on the papers on the very foundation of the appellant's cause of action.
The appellant must have been aware of this when she launched her application.
Faced with a most formidable task on appeal Mr. Maqutu on behalf of the appellant delivered an able argument. While readily conceding that there was clearly a dispute of fact on the papers which could not be resolved he urged that the dispute was apparent rather than real. He claimed that there was no real or
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genuine dispute of fact.
He relied upon section 80 of the Basuto Constitution. He submitted that in terns of that section the king could only approve of a recommendation by publication in the Gazette and that there had been no such publication. I may say at once that this argument was not advanced in the Court below nor is anything said in the affidavits about non publication. However I shall nevertheless assume in favour of the appellant that this point is available to her.
The relevant part of section 80 reads :
"after the expiration of thirty days from the date on which any finding, decision or recommendation shall have been communicated to the parties in pursuance of sub-section 2 of section seventy-eight of this order, or if there is a review of such proceedings, after the High Court has determined the matter, the Paramount Chief shall give his final decision in accordance with the finding, decision or recommendation of the College or the Standing Committee.......................
Any such decision shall be made public in such manner as may be prescribed and thereupon shall be conclusive and binding upon all
persons affected thereby........."
The section does not assist the appellant for it is clear from its terms that the decision of the Paramount Chief must be arrived at before publication and the object of the publication is purely to make the decision binding upon all persons affected thereby. There is no question of publication being part of the making of the decision. The point must fail.
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Then Mr. Maqutu subjected the respondents' affidavits to the most critical analysis attacking the quality and cogency thereof. While that argument may well prove productive at a trial it does not bear upon the question as to whether or not there is a real or genuine dispute of fact on the papers.
In my opinion the dispute of fact in this case goes to the very heart of the appellant's case. It is a real and genuine dispute as is apparent from an examination of the affidavits which is referred to earlier herein.
The final question is whether the learned Judge a quo was correct in dismissing the application. Where a genuine dispute of fact cannot be resolved on the papers the Court has a discretion as to what course to follow. This will depend inter alia on the attitude of the parties and what the applicant should have foreseen.
In this case the applicant must have appreciated when she launched her application, that a serious dispute of fact would arise. She elected to take that risk. Moreover at no time was it suggested to the Court a quo that the matter he referred for the hearing of oral evidence or referred to trial. In these circumstances the learned Judge properly exercised his discretion in dismissing the application.
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In my judgment the appeal must be dismissed with costs.
Delivered at Maseru on the 16th day of July, 1993
(Signed)
R.N. LEON
JUDGE OF APPEAL
I agree
I. MAHOMED
JUDGE PRESIDENT
G.P.KOTZE