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C of A (CRI) 5/90
IN THE LESOTHO COURT OF APPEAL
In the Appeal of:
TSITSO MATSABA APPELLANT
v
R E X RESPONDENT
Held at Maseru
Coram : Kotze' J.A.
Browde J.A.
Leon J.A.
JUDGMENT
Kotze' J.A.
Following upon a series of grotesque killings by shooting Tsitso Matsaba (hereinafter referred to as "the appellant" for want of a more accurate description) stood trial before Lehohla J. and assessors in the High Court on five counts of murder committed at Mount Moorosi on 6th
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July 1988. I find it unnecessary to canvass the details of the offences charged. Suffice it to say that the trial Court found the allegations contained in the indictment proved but that at the relevant time appellant did not know what he was doing and that he was, as a result of voluntary intoxication, insane. As a result the trial court invoked the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 2 of the Criminal Liability of Intoxicated Persons Proclamation 60 of 1938 and returned a special verdict or finding in terms of sub-section (3) of section 172 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 7 of 1981 to the effect that the appellant is guilty of the acts charged against him, that he was insane at the time when he did the act and ordered him to be kept in custody in an appropriate prison pending the signification of the King's pleasure. The appellant purported to note an appeal against the said special verdict or finding on the grounds that the trial court erred
in applying the provisions of Proclamation 60 of 1938 and
in not convicting him of culpable homicide.
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At the hearing of the "appeal" this Court mero motu requested Counsel to prepare and submit argument as to whether a finding in terms of sub-section (3) of section 172 of Act 7 of 1981 is a "conviction" for the purpose of sub-section (1) of section
7 of the Court of Appeal Act 10 of 1978 and, if not, whether an appeal is competent at the instance of the appellant in terms of the said sub-section (1) of section 7. We are indebted to Counsel for their swift and helpful response to the Court's request.
Sub-section (1) of section 7 of Act 10 of 1978 provides that "any person convicted on a trial by the High Court may appeal to the Court "(i.e. this Court)" on any matter of fact as well as on any matter of law."
The crucial question to be determined in deciding whether an appeal is properly before this Court therefore is whether the special verdict or finding of the Court a quo is a "conviction" within the meaning of that term in subsection (1) of section 7 of the Court of Appeal Act. The Appellate Division of South Africa held in R v Ngema and R_ v Cele 1960 (1) S.A. 137 that the somewhat similar South African provision contained in sub-section (1) of section
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29 of the Mental Disorders Act, 38 of 1916 does not constitute a conviction. In so far as relevant the South African sub-section reads:
"When ... any act or omission is alleged against any person as an offence ... if it appears ... to the court ... that he did the act or made the omission charged but was mentally disordered or defective ... at the time when he did or made the . same ... the court ... shall return a special verdict or finding to the effect that the accused was guilty of the act or omission charged against him, but was mentally disordered or defective ... at the time when he. did the act or made the omission."
OGILVIE THOMPSON, J.A. (with whom four other Judges of Appeal concurred) said:
" Examining sec. 29 (1), it lays down that, where its introductory provisions are satisfied, the court etc. must return the
"special verdict or finding" described in the sub-section. The terms of that special verdict, and indeed of the section as a whole, make it plain, I think, that the accused is not by the special verdict convicted of the offence alleged against him in the indictment summons or criminal charge upon which he has stood his trial. The special verdict does employ the word "guilty",
but it is to be observed that the words are "guilty of the act or omission charged against him", and not "guilty of the offence". Furthermore, the words "as aforesaid", where they occur in the remaining portion of the special verdict, relate back to the earlier portion of the section. Thus expanded, the concluding portion of the special verdict reads:
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but was mentally disordered or defective so as not to be responsible according to law for the act or omission charged at the time when he did the act or made the omission".
It is thus apparent that the words "guilty of the act or omission", where they occur in the special verdict, mean no more than "committed the act or omission".
The above passage is, in my view, entirely applicable to the legislation here in issue and is decisive. The section 172 does not constitute a conviction for the purpose, of sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Court of Appeal Act is therefore unavoidable.
One further consideration lends support to this conclusion. Intoxication in the limited circumstances envisaged by sub-section (2) of the Criminal Liability of Intoxicated Persons Act which sets the provisions of subsection (3) of section 172 of the Criminal
Procedure and Evidence Act into operation constitutes a "defence" to the criminal charge in question. Being so regarded by the legislation which lies at the root of the Court's finding it would be incongruous to regard it as a "conviction".
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The matter should in my view be struck off the roll.
Delivered at Maseru this 16th day of July, 1993.
G. P. C. KOTZE'
JUDGE OF APPEAL
I agree. The matter is struck off the roll.
J. BROWDE
I agree.
R. N. LEON