CRI/A/27/93
IN THE HIGH COURT OF LESOTHO
In the matter between:
RAPHAEL MOFOOA APPELLANT
V
REX
Before the Honourable Chief Justice Mr. Justice B.P. Cullinan on the 8th day of November, 1993.
For the Appellant : Mr. B. Sooknanan
For the Crown : Mr. T.J. Semoko
JUDGMENT
The accused was charged before the Subordinate Court of the Second Class for Maseru. The charge read thus:
"That the said accused is charged with C/S 37F (1) (a) read with (b) of Act No.14 of 1991. In that upon or about the 22nd May 1991 and at or near Hyperama Maseru the said accused did unlawfully steal two watches being articles from the premises damaged or which have been damaged recently by disaster, riot or civil commotion at the said Hyperama stores."
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Section 37F (l)(a) and (b) of the Internal Security (General) Act, 1984 (as amended by Order No.14 of 1991) reads thus:
"37F. (1) A person who -
steals any article from premises which are being damaged, or which have been recently damaged by disaster, riot or civil commotion or which have been vacated by reason of impending, present or recent disaster, riot or civil commotion or in consequence of an order or direction given by a member of the police force of the rank of Sergeant or above for the purpose of -
preserving the public safety; or
(ii) maintaining public order, or
(iii) protecting persons or property from the dangers involved in or consequent upon disaster, riot or civil commotion, or
steals any article which has been left exposed or unprotected as a consequence of impending, present or recent disaster, riot or civil commotion; or .....
commits an offence of looting and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a period not exceeding fifteen years."
Separate offences are disclosed under paras.(a) and (b) of section 37 F(l) and the reference to para.(b) in the charge in my view renders the charge bad for uncertainty. Secondly, Mr. Sooknanan submits that there is no averment as to ownership or lawful possession in the charge. That would certainly be necessary in the case of a theft at common law. The statutory provisions indicate that in a charge under section 37F(l)(a) it
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is necessary to aver only that Che property was stolen "from premises". The difficulty with the present charge is that it does not clearly indicate that the property was stolen by the appellant from the particular premises, or whether having been
removed from the premises by another and been "left exposed or unprotected", the appellant thereafter stole the property.
The charge was clearly defective. So also was the statement of facts. There is no allegation of stealing as such, or indeed of ownership,
in the statement of facts. The accused agreed with the statement of facts, but that takes matters no further. The statement of facts raises the inference of theft, but not as the only reasonable inference. A statement of facts, as those very words indicate, must consist of a statement of facts, as such, which of themselves establish each and every ingredient of the offence.
The plea in the present case was equivocal and the trial thereafter was a nullity. The appeal is allowed therefore. The conviction and sentence in the Court below are set aside and I order that the accused be retried before another Magistrate of competent jurisdiction.
Delivered at Maseru this 8th of November, 1993.
B.P. CULLINAN
CHIEF JUSTICE
CRI/A/26/93
TOKA MOOROSI
Before the Honourable Chief Justice Mr. Justice B.P. Cullinan on the 2nd day of November, 1993.
For the Appellant : Mr. K.T. Khauoe
For the Respondent : Miss N. Nku
The accused was charged before the Subordinate Court of the First Class for the Butha-Buthe district. He pleaded guilty and agreed with a statement of facts and was thereafter convicted on his own plea and sentenced to 6 months imprisonment and a fine of M400, or 12 months imprisonment in default of payment thereof. The charge read as follows:
"Toka Moorosi a mosotho male adult of about 48 years of headman Thaabe Matela at Liqhobong charged with the offence of c/s 3(2) act No.17/1966 of Arm & Ammunitions in that upon or about the 27th day of May 1993 and at or near Liqhobong in the said district the
said accused did wrongfully and unlawfully found in possession of 4 rounds without being in possession of a firearm certificate in force at the time.
The relevant legislation is to be found in sections 2 and 3 of the Internal Security Arms & Ammunition Act, 1966, and reads as follows:
"2......
"ammunition except where otherwise
expressly, provided, means ammunition for any firearm as herein defined and includes grenades, bombs and other like missiles, whether
capable of use with such a firearm or not, and prohibited ammunition;
"firearm except where otherwise
expressly provided, means any lethal barrelled weapon of any description from which any shot, bullet or other missile can be discharged and includes any prohibited weapon whether it is such a lethal weapon as aforesaid or not, any component part accessory to any such weapon designed or adapted to diminish the noise or flash caused by firing the weapon [and includes an air gun, air rifle or
air pistol;]
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, no person shall purchase, acquire or have in his possession any firearm or ammunition unless he holds a firearm certificate in force at the time.
If any person -
purchases, acquires or has in his possession any firearm or ammunition without holding a firearm certificate in force at the time, or otherwise than is authorised by such a certificate, or in the case
of ammunition, in quantities in excess of those so authorised; or
fails to comply with any condition subject to which a firearm certificate is held by him;
he shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, for each offence be liable on conviction to the penalty prescribed in section 43."
The offence, in this case, under section 3(2) is the unlawful possession of ammunition. Nowhere in the charge, or indeed the subsequent
statement of facts, is the word "ammunition" used. The statement of facts contains the words "4 bullets of '38 pistol",
but even if the charge contained those words, it would not alter the situation. The word used in the charge sheet is "rounds",
and that in the statements of facts is "bullets", which word, the learned Crown Counsel Miss Nku concedes, is sometimes used to describe the complete round of ammunition, in all its component parts, and also the actual projectile propelled from the firearm after the explosion of the propellant charge. Indeed, the definition of 'firearm' above, indicates that the latter is the more appropriate meaning.
It will be seen further that the word "ammunition" is capable of two meanings, namely ammunition which is "capable of use with .... a firearm" and ammunition which is not capable of being so used, for example, a bomb. In my view therefore it was necessary for the prosecution, so that the accused might know the
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case he was facing, to have alleged that the accused was in possession of four rounds of ammunitrion "capable of use with a firearm". In this case the calibre of the firearm was identified, so that the prosecution should have alleged Chat the accused
"unlawfully had in his possession four rounds of ammunition capable of use with a firearm of ' 38 calibre, without holding a firearm certificate in force at the time."
The charge was therefore defective. Further, in as much as the statement of facts did not contain the necessary averment, it did not disclose a prima facie case.
During the course of the address by the accused in mitigation, the learned trial Magistrate observed that
"One of the four (4) bullets was tested immediately before Court and it fired effectively."
That observation was apparently in answer to the appellant's statement that what was before Court "cannot fire any longer". The learned trial Magistrate's observation, however, takes the matter no further. It was for the Crown to allege that the four rounds of ammunition were capable of use with a firearm,namely a '38 pistol. There being a plea of guilty, it would not have
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been necessary, by expert evidence, to prove such aspect. But it was necessary for the Crown to state such aspect and the prosecution did not do so.
As the statement of facts did not disclose a "prima facie", the plea was therefore equivocal and the trial was a nullity. I have considered the aspect of a re-trial. As I have observed, the charge was in any event defective. I consider therefore that in all the circumstances, this is not a proper case in which to order a re-trial.
The appeal is allowed therefore, and the conviction and sentence are set aside.
Delivered at Maseru this 2nd day of November, 1993.
B.P. Cullinan