CRI/A/54/87
In THE HIGH COURT OF LESOTHO
In the Appeal of:-
KHOTO RAKOBUOA Appellant
Vs
REX Respondent
JUDGMENT
Delivered by the Honourable Acting Mr. Justice M. Lehotola on the 30th day of May; 1988
The appellant has appealed to this Court against a sentence imposed on him by the learned magistrate Mokhotlong on 10th February, 1987.
Appellant pleaded guilty to the two charges preferred against him. These consisted of (a) contravening section 3 (2) of the Internal Security (Arms and Ammunition) Act No. 17 of 1966 and (b) attempted murder.
On count one appellant was sentenced to pay a fine of M120-00 or in default thereof to serve a prison term of six months. On count two he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. It was ordered further that the sentences in both these counts are to run concurrently.
The basis of the appeal is two-pronged. First, that the sentence is excessive and creates a sense of shock regard being
2
had to the nature of the crime and the fact that appellant was a first offender. Secondly that the learned magistrate erred in that before imposing the sentence he did not enquire and take into consideration the mitigating factors in favour of Appellant. It was argued that had he borne in mind these factors the learned magistrate would not have failed to appreciate circumstances which led to the commission of the offence of attempted murder and the disadvantage that appellant was labouring under at trial as an unrepresented litigant.
The first ground of appeal is partly self-defeating to the extent that it seeks to make light of the offence of attempted murder. Such an offence is on ail accounts a serious offence. The record shows on page two that complainant ran away when he saw appellant hurriedly coming at him. Appellant was on a mission looking for his missing stock. Appellant chased after him. Then complainant started collecting stones and throwing them at appellant. The latter pointed his firearm at the complainant and shot him on the leg whereupon complainant once more fled but was caught by another bullet on the right buttock.
Further, Mr. Qhomane for the Crown submitted that the more fact that a man is a first offender does not entitle him to be treated leniently by the courts. I agree with this submission and 1 think it fits in well with circumstances of this case. Moreover the learned magistrate made reference to it thus clearly showing he took it into account in imposing sentence.
It was argued that appellant had some reason to shoot while it seems in the learned magistrate's view he had none. But reference to the record shows that in his judgment the learned magistrate
3
stated that appellant did not have a reaonsable excuse for shooting. His evaluation of the relevant factors in the evidence before him cannot be faulted because while conceding that at some stage or another complainant seemed to pose some danger to appellant such danger was not such as would warrant use of the firearm. It has to also be borne in mind that appellant was not alone. He was in company of others whose efforts were directed at questioning the complainant about their missing stock. But from the manner in which they rushed at him he took fright and fled. What reasonable use could have been made of the firearm against complainant in such circumstances leaving aside the fact that even after he had sustained the first injury with a bullet he was fetched some more on the buttock - part of the body which clearly suggests complainant was facing away from appellant and his company?
It was further argued that as borne out in his judgment the learned magistrate was carried away by emotion with the result that he indulged in speculation about what would have happened to the complainant if a more vital organ of his body was hit than the leg and buttock. It was submitted that if he had not indulged in such speculation the sentence imposed might have been much lighter.
My view is that it is only natural for a judicial officer faced with a case of this nature to fear for the worst even if he does not reflect his fears on record. Regard being had to the sentence imposed and the fact that the order is that sentences are to run concurrently I do not think that even though he reflected his fears on record the sentence exceeds the gravity of the offence. I do appreciate that injuries may as in this case be light and not dangerous to life as where a cannon ball singes one's ear. But the
4
real and possible danger to life occasioned by reckless and deliberate use of firearms cannot be ignored.
The only thing that has caused me some unease is the order that sentences should run concurrently where under one count there is an option of a fine. If appellant has paid the fine imposed instead of serving the six months' jail sentence it appears to me that his effort would be worthless because the six months would be subsumed in the two years that he would have to serve. In this regard the option of a fine imposed is illusory. It is not proper to impose a sentence or give a judgment that is illusory.
Section 301 of the C P & E Act 1981 (1) (a) says when
"a person is convicted of two or more different offences; or (b) a person under sentence or undergoing punishment for one offence is convicted of another offence,
the court may sentence him to such several punishment for such offences or for such last offence, as the case may be, as the court
is competent to impose.
" Subsection (2) provides that:
"The punishment under this section, when consisting of imprisonment shall commence the one after the expiration.....-----of
the other, in such order as the court may direct unless the court directs that such punishments shall run concurrently."
It is clear that what this section provides is that if punishments are to run concurrently it should be punishments consisting of imprisonment, not partly fines and partly terms of imprisonment.
Regard may also be had to the observation of Rooney J in Mohapi and others vs. Rex 1981 (1) LLR at 7 et seg that
5
"I do not know how the practice arose of taking more than one count together for purposes of sentences. There is nothing in the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Proclamation which authorises the practice and a reading of Section 295 {now 301 of the CP&E Act 1981) suggests that the proper course when a person is convicted at one trial of two or more different offences is for the court to sentence him to such several punishments for such offences as it is competent to impose. It is clearly inappropriate to lump together different offences for the purposes of sentences, when the type of punishment or the maximum punishment which may be imposed for one offence differs from another."
See Review Order No 22/87 Rex vs Makiba (unreported) at 3 and 4. See also Review Order No. 4/87 Rex vs Poll (unreported) where Kheola A.C.J. as he then was said at page 2
"It is abundantly clear.........that it is only in respect of sentences of imprisonment that the court may order that the sentences must run concurrently."
In Review Order 24/87 R. vs Sekhela and another (unreported) at 2 this court observed that :
"A quick look at South African case law throughout ages abundantly shows illogical consequences which flow from adopting the
procedure followed by the court below. Hence I am of the view that it should not be adopted. See Rex vs Setibe 1934 AD 56, R. vs Sitole 1955 (1) P.H. H84 (N) and R. vs Keizer 1955 (4) S.A. 204,"
In Setibe above at page 58 Gardiner A.J.A. said:
"The magistrate directed the alternative periods of imprisonment to run concurrently and in that he was quite justified. As to the fine, however, it is a little difficult to know what the magistrate had in mind because the section does not speak of fines, and, even apart from the section, fines can hardly be conceived of as 'running concurrently'. The effect, however, of the deletion of the words 'to run concurrently1 is to double the period of imprisonment imposed by the magistrate ....." (my underlining).
6
It seems to me that in count 1 the magistrate intended that appellant should not serve the six months prison term if he paid the fine as an alternative penalty. But because it was incompetent to maka such fine run concurrently with the two year term of imprisonment in count 2, it is fitting to delete the words to run concurrently". But because this will have the effect of extending the prison term by six months whereas the magistrate intended appellant to serve only two years the sentence in count 2 is reduced by six months. Mindful of the fact that appellant pleaded guilty and did not waste the time of the court the order made by the. court below on sentence is set aside and substituted by the following :-
In count 1 accused is sentenced to pay a fine of M120 or in default serve six months' imprisonment,
In Count II accused is sentenced to one and half years imprisonment.
N.B. Exhibit 1 is forfieted to the Crown.
M.L. LEHOHLA
ACTING JUDGE.
28th May, 1988.
For the Appellant - In person
For the Respondent - Mr. Qhomane