C OF A (CIV) NO. 1/2007
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF LESOTHO
HELD AT MASERU
In the matter between:
THE NATIONAL INDEPENDENT PARTY (NIP) FIRST APPELLANT
THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (NIP) SECOND APPELLANT
'MATSOTETSI MPESI THIRD APPELLANT
and
ANTHONY CLOVIS MANYELI FIRST RESPONDENT
THE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL
COMMISSION (IEC) SECOND RESPONDENT
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THIRD RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
CORAM: STEYN, P
RAMODIBEDI, JA
MAJARA, J
RAMODIBEDI JA
[1] This appeal concerns a dispute arising from two party lists submitted by the respective parties to the second respondent ("the IEC") in terms of section
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49B of the National Assembly Election (No.l) (Amendment Act, 2001) ("the Act").
[2] The facts show that on 17 January 2007, the
first appellant, acting through the third appellant who is its Secretary General, submitted a party list, annexure "E", to the IEC pursuant to section 49B of the Act.
[3] On 19 January 2007, the first respondent,
who is the President and Leader of the first appellant, however, submitted his own separate party list, annexure "D", to the IEC. The names of the candidates mentioned on that list were different from those mentioned on the party list, annexure "E", which had already been submitted by the appellant.
[4] On 23 January 2007, the first respondent lodged a formal objection with the IEC to the acceptance of the first appellant's party list, annexure "E", in terms of section 49E of the Act.
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[5] On 25 January 2007, the IEC rejected the first respondent's objection. This prompted him to apply to the High Court for a review of the IEC's proceedings that had culminated in the rejection of his challenge. He cited as respondents the IEC, the present appellants and the Attorney General, in that order. In relevant parts, his prayers were couched in these terms:-
"4.1 First Respondent's overruling of Applicant's objection to the party list submitted by Second Respondent on behalf of Fourth Respondent on 18th January 2007 be reviewed and set aside as being irregular and contrary to specific instruction of Applicant;
4.2 directing First Respondent to accept the party list submitted by Applicant on 19 January 2007, as the only proper, legitimate and final party list of Fourth Respondent;
4.3 directing First and Second Respondents to pay the costs hereof and other Respondents to pay the costs hereof in the event of
opposing this matter."
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[6] On 29 January 2007, the first respondent obtained a rule nisi as prayed returnable on 31 January 2007.
[7] On the return day, the High Court (Mahase AJ) granted "default judgment" against the IEC and the Attorney General. This, despite the appellants' objection that such a procedure would prejudice them in the sense that the order sought and obtained at that stage evidently affected them directly. This appeal was accordingly brought against the correctness of the order in question.
[8] Before proceeding further, it is convenient to record at this stage that after hearing submissions on the merits in this matter, on 9 February 2007, this Court upheld the appeal and granted the orders set out below. We intimated that reasons would follow. These are the reasons.
[9] In view of the parties' attitude as fully set out in paragraph [16] below it is strictly speaking unnecessary to comment at length on the propriety of
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the court a quo's "default judgment" in application proceedings. It shall suffice merely to state two elementary principles.
Default judgment is governed by Rule 27 of the High Court Rules 1980 which deals with actions. Applications on the other hand are governed by Rule 8. Sub-rule 13 thereof provides that where no answering affidavit nor any notice to raise any question of law without any answering affidavit has been delivered within the stipulated time the applicant may apply to the Registrar to allocate a date for the hearing of the application. This procedure was not followed in the court below. No notice was given and no application was made to the Registrar for a date for hearing. The application was simply moved from the bar.
Where parties are sued jointly, as here, it is impermissible for a court to grant an order which prejudicially affects the interests of the
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other party thereto without first giving such a party an opportunity to be heard on the merits. In casu, it is important to bear in mind that the IEC and the Attorney General were merely cited in their nominal capacities. They had no vested interests in the internecine dispute between the two warring parties.
[10] It is not disputed that the appellants on the other hand had a direct and substantial interest in the order sought and granted against the IEC and the Attorney General by "default". It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that in granting the order in question the court a quo effectively disposed of the matter without hearing them. This contention is clearly unanswerable and will require no further elaboration. It was entirely inappropriate in these circumstances to move for default judgment in a matter brought on notice of motion where substantive relief of the nature outlined in the application was sought against parties who not only had such interest
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in the proceedings but had duly signified their opposition thereto.
[11] It requires to be stressed that the mere fact that two of the parties did not contest the challenge to the decision of the I.E.C., did not entitle the court a quo to consider whether to grant relief or not separately from the adjudication of the rights of the parties who contested the validity of the applicant's challenge. The application for default judgment took the litigation upon a procedural course which was not only confusing but ultimately resulted in absurd outcomes. It will be noted in this regard that the court a quo granted a default judgment directly affecting the rights of litigants that were not before it and whose case was not up for debate or decision. Moreover, such application was fundamentally flawed because it did not comply with the provisions of the Rules of Court as fully set out above.
The court a quo clearly erred in granting the order it did in these circumstances.
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JURISDICTION
[12] The next matter that needs to be adjudicated is whether the court order in question is a "determination" within the meaning of section 69 of the Constitution and therefore not appealable. It has been submitted on behalf of the first respondent that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the matter on appeal. The legislative provision on which reliance is placed for this proposition reads as follows:-
"69. (1) The High Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any question whether -
any person is validly nominated or designated as a Senator under section 55 of the Constitution;
............
.................
................
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(6) The determination by the High Court of any question under this section shall not be subject to appeal"
[13] In his heads of argument Mr Ntlhoki for the first respondent has underlined the word "nominated" in subsection 69 (1) of the Constitution. He then proceeds to make the following submission: -
"The Honourable Court is respectfully requested to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Party List submitted by Third Appellant on behalf of First Appellant purported to nominate First Appellant's candidates for proportional representation in Parliament. First Respondent wanted to set it aside. The court a quo found in favour of First Respondent concerning this nomination. As such this matter fell under section 69 of the Constitution to which the High Court has jurisdiction and on which its decision is not subject to an appeal."
[14] The first respondent's objection to this Court's jurisdiction in the matter falls to be dismissed essentially for two reasons:-
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As is apparent from section 69 (1) (a) of the Constitution, the nomination, referred to relates to a position as a Senator.
Accordingly, it has nothing to do with nomination of candidates for election by proportional representation under section 49B (1) of the Act. It will be noted that, if elected, such candidates become members of the National Assembly. They do not become members of the Senate. In this regard section 54 of the Constitution provides as follows :-
"54. There shall be a Parliament which shall consist of the King, a Senate and a National Assembly."
It need hardly be stressed then that the Senate and the National Assembly are two separate bodies. Nomination to one body cannot by any stretch of the imagination be nomination to the other.
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The use of the word "determination" in section 69 (6) is significant. - Clearly the Legislature had in mind that only a final and conclusive decision by the High Court would not be subject to an appeal. Moreover, in view of the fact that a litigant is in accordance with this provision deprived of the right to claim relief from a High Court's "determination" the section needs to be restrictively interpreted.
It cannot be seriously contended that the granting of a default judgment is a "determination" of the rights and obligations of the parties to the litigation. It is common cause that such a judgment is capable of rescission on a variety of grounds such as error or other good cause shown. For these reasons alone it is clear that the legislative bar to an appeal cannot be lawfully invoked to deprive any of the parties of the right to appeal against such a decision.
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[15] For these reasons the appellants were entitled to challenge the default judgment granted by the High Court. Such a judgment was in our opinion a nullity.
[16] But, bearing in mind that the court a quo had not dealt with the merits of the application as against the appellants, a successful appeal in this Court would have necessitated a remittal of the case to the court a quo for completion. Such a course would in turn have undoubtedly had disastrous results for the parties. This is so in view of the fact that the general election in question was due to be held only a week away, namely on 17 February 2007. It was for these reasons that this Court agreed to consider, at the request of the parties, the merits of the issues raised in the application in the court below. The parties must accordingly be commended for adopting this sensible approach.
NON JOINDER
[17] One of the issues raised by the appellants was that the first respondent should be non-suited
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because he had failed to join all the interested and affected parties. It is instructive to bear in mind that the first appellant's party list, annexure "E", which was duly accepted by the IEC contained 52 proportional representation candidates. It has been submitted correctly on behalf of the appellants that once the party list in question was accepted by the IEC, as indeed it was, this conferred on them the status of being first appellant's candidates. They had clearly acquired a direct and substantial interest in the matter. Despite the fact that the order prayed for sought to disqualify these candidates, the first respondent failed to join them in the application. The question to be answered is, does this failure non-suit the respondent?
[18] In The National Executive Committee of the Lesotho National Olympic Committee and Others v Paul Motlatsi Morolong C of A (CIV) NO.26/01 this Court made the following remarks which bear repetition:-
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"The question of non-joinder of interested parties is one that has perturbed this Court for a long time. For example more than seventeen years ago in Masopha v Mota 1985-89 LAC 58 (decided on 28 January 1985) this Court took the point of non-joinder mero motu and set aside the High Court order which had annulled a marriage where the woman whose marriage was at issue had not been joined as a party. In the process this Court laid down the following guideline:-
This case illustrates the need to consider and identify those who can be affected by the result of proceedings and to ensure that they are party to the proceedings.'
Three sessions later, that is to say on 25 July 1986, this Court again strongly deprecated the practice of non-joinder of interested parties in Matime and Others v Moruthoane and Another 1985-89 LAC 198 at 200 in the following words:
'This (non-joinder) is a matter that no Court, even at the latest stage in proceedings, can overlook, because the Court of Appeal
cannot allow orders to stand against persons who may be interested, but who had no opportunity to present their case.'
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In Basotho Congress Party & Others v Director of Elections and Others 1997-98 LLR & LB 518 at 531 this Court once more expressed
itself on a similar point of non-joinder in the following terms:-
'In the first place appellants were not the only parties involved in the election. It is inconceivable that a Court could have considered postponing the election without at least involving the other parties in these proceedings and giving them an opportunity to be heard. The appellants should therefore have been non-suited on this ground alone."'
See also Mabusetsa Makharilele and Others v National Executive Committee of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy and Others CIV/APN/82/02:
Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour 1949 (3) SA 637 (A).
[19] It will be recalled from paragraph [5] above that the first respondent launched review proceedings as opposed to appeal. Section 49E (4) of the Act, however, provides as follows:-
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"The objector or the political party concerned may appeal against the decision of the Commission to the High Court in the
prescribed manner by not later than the date stated in the electoral timetable". (Emphasis supplied.)
[20] The choice of the word "appeal" in the section is crucial as it signifies a rehearing while a review is not. See Tickly and Others v Johannes NO and Others 1963 (2) SA 588 (T) at 590 F - 591 A. Bearing in mind the importance of general elections, the Legislature in its wisdom obviously intended that decisions of the IEC on objections to party lists should be brought by way of a rehearing before the High Court. A review on the other hand does not have such an advantage as it is directed at grounds such as illegality, procedural impropriety and irrationality. See Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [19841 3 ALL ER 935 (HL) also reported in [19851 AC 374 (HL; Bolofo and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions 1995-1999 LAC 231.
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[21] There are no grounds of review set out in the first respondent's founding affidavit. In paragraph 12 he states the following:-
"First Respondent's actions are wholly insupportable in law. They are wrongful and unlawful and amount to interference with
internal affairs of Fourth Respondent by taking sides and thus ensuring that people who are clearly not members of Fourth Respondent
such as those (sic) are listed above become beneficiaries of the arrangement to the prejudice of members of Fourth Respondent including me who has been left out of the Party List submitted by Second Respondent i.e. annexure "E". Once Applicant was advised of the internal problems within Fourth Applicant prior to the submission of Party List he was obliged to ensure that all Parties involved were heard on the matter and if there was no agreement, the Parties involved in the dispute concerning the proper list be free to approach the Court of law to resolve the matter."
Clearly, these are grounds of appeal and not review. The first respondent sought to found his challenge on the latter ground and not the former.
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[22] It follows that by proceeding by way of review and not appeal, the first respondent misconceived his remedy.
THE MERITS
[23] It is necessary to comment next on the findings of the court a quo. In her "default judgment" the learned Judge a quo debated the merits of the matter. In the process she made the following findings, namely, that:-
the third appellant had no authority to represent the first and second appellants;
the third appellant was pursuing her own personal interests at the expense of the party;
the third appellant had not been supported by a single member of the first appellant's NEC in her averments; 19
the first appellant's failure to annex a resolution of its general conference in support of the party list, annexure "E", was fatal;
the third appellant's answering affidavit was riddled with inconsistencies and contradictions in pursuit of her personal interests;
the third appellant's version was not to be believed;
the decision of the first appellant in respect of the party list was "unacceptable politically and morally."
As will become apparent shortly, these findings were completely unjustified on the facts.
AUTHORITY AND/OR RESOLUTION
[24] A perusal of the court a quo's judgment shows that the findings referred to in the preceding
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paragraph were generally motivated by the fact that the appellants had not annexed the resolution of the general conference of the party sanctioning the party list, annexure "E". A few quotations from the judgment a quo will suffice to highlight the point. The court says the following:-
"Such an omission by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th respondents (now the appellants) to annex/attach such an important piece of evidence (i.e. the resolution) to their papers has inflicted a big fatal blow to their case. It is trite law that a resolution of such a nature should always be attached to the papers in an application of this nature; otherwise there is no way in which this court can be persuaded that the 4th respondent did indeed pass such a resolution. This is moreso since the applicant who is the President of the 4th respondent denies that there was ever any meeting of a special conference held on the days mentioned in the answering affidavit of 2nd respondent."
[25] She goes on in the same vein and says the following:-
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"It has already been indicated above that such a resolution referred to, has not been annexed to the papers herein. The said
respondent's papers are clearly fatally defective for want of that resolution."
[26] It is a matter of regret that by holding a dogmatic view that failure to attach a resolution is fatal in motion proceedings to a party's case regardless of the circumstances, the learned Judge a quo fell exactly into the same error she committed in Lesotho Revenue Authority and Others v Olympic Off Sales C of A (CIV) NO. 13/06. That was a case in which a decree of perpetual silence was sought. In the course of that judgment Mahase AJ had said the following:-
"2nd respondent's allegation in his answering affidavit, at paragraph 1 that 1st respondent had duly resolved to oppose this
application and has authorized him to file this answering affidavit on behalf of all the respondents herein is inadmissible hearsay
evidence in the absence of a resolution of the 1st respondent's Board of Directors and also in the absence of a supporting affidavit by a person who was present in that meeting when the said Board so resolved. Indeed the issue as to the resolution of the said Board is a fact which should be proved by annexing the
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said minutes of the said Board of Directors of the 1st respondent."
[27] This Court had no difficulty in rejecting Mahase AJ's reliance on this technical objection which clearly had no regard to the circumstances of the case, such as the fact that the second respondent in that case had duly stated on oath in his answering affidavit that the first respondent had duly resolved to oppose the application in question and to authorize the second respondent to file an answering affidavit.
[28] Similarly, and as regards the first appellant's resolution of its general conference sanctioning the submission of a party list to the IEC, the third appellant deposed on oath as follows in paragraph 4.2 of her answering affidavit:-
"4.2 The correct position is as follows:
On the 13th to 14th January, 2007 the 3rd Respondent had duly convened the 4th Respondent's Special National Conference at
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the A.M.E. Conference Hall in the Maseru urban area.
At the said sitting the 4th Respondent's Special Conference resolved and decided inter alia:
i) on the party list for proportional representation; and
ii) not to field and/or endorse any candidate to contest elections in any constituency (including the Constituency of Maama NO .40).
The 3rd and 4th Respondents have always and still consider the said resolution as binding, emanating as it does, from the Party's
Supreme authority.
Consequently, 4th Respondent could not and at no stage did it ever authorize the endorsement of any candidate to contest elections in eight constituencies as the applicant would like this Honourable Court to believe."
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[29] In paragraph 7 of his replying affidavit, the first respondent simply made a bare denial to the allegations contained in the preceding paragraph. More importantly, his denial was only premised on the fact that the appellants had omitted to annex the resolution in question.
[30] Contrary to the finding by the court a quo, the third appellant was explicitly supported by the Vice President and member of the first appellant's NEC, namely, Dominic Motseki Motikoe. He filed a supporting affidavit confirming as true and correct the entire contents of the answering affidavit by the third appellant.
[31] In any event, to put the matter beyond any doubt, the resolution in question has been produced before this Court as Appendix "2". In this regard Rule 17 (5) (c) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2006 reads as follows :-
"(5) Without prejudice to the generality of the aforegoing, the Court shall have the power to –
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receive further evidence at the hearing of an appeal"
[32] As regards the third appellant's authority to act on behalf of the other appellants, the learned Judge a quo overlooked paragraph 1.2 and 6.2.1 of the third appellant's answering affidavit. Therein she deposed on oath as follows:-
"1.2 I am entitled to make this affidavit by reason of being a cited party in these proceedings as well as being duly authorized to depose to same by 3rd and 4th Respondents" (now second and first appellants).
"6.2.1 I was duly authorized by the 3rd Respondent to submit the 4th Respondent party list by virtue of being the Secretary-General of the said Party."
These averments were met by no more than a bare denial in the first respondent's replying affidavit, based, once again, on the premise
that the resolution in question had not been annexed.
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[33] In view of the importance of the resolution in question, it is convenient to reproduce it in full. It reads :-
"EXTRACT FROM THE MINUTES OF SPECIAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE NATIONAL INDEPENDENT PARTY HELD AT MASERU ON THE 13th TO 14th JANUARY 2007
Present: Quoram Revolved:
1. To establish an alliance between the National Independent Party (NIP) and the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) for purposes of the 2007 general elections in terms whereof:
1.1 The Party List to be submitted to the Independent Electoral Commission in respect of the proportional representation Seats shall contain names of NIP members and LCD members, provided that the first five members on the list shall be NIP members.
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1.2 LCD shall not submit any Party List of its own in respect of the proportional representation Seats, but shall throw its full weight behind the NIP in the election for proportional representation Seats.
1.3 NIP shall not field and/or endorse any Candidates in respect of Constituency elections in all the Constituencies, but it shall throw its full weight behind LCD in the elections for Constituency Seats.
To authorize the President or the Vice President or the General Secretary of NIP to sign the said alliance agreement on behalf of NIP.
To authorize NIP National Executive Committee to do all that is necessary to implement this resolution.
Certified a true extract National Secretary General"
[34] Similarly, second appellant's resolution to oppose the application and to authorize the third appellant "to sign the power of attorney, affidavits and
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any document necessary to give effect to the resolution above" has been produced before this Court as Appendix "3".
[35] Even without regard to the production of the resolutions aforesaid, it is evident from the reasoning above that the appellants' version should have been preferred to that of the first respondent. See in this regard the well-known judgment in Plascon - Evans Paints v Van Riebeeck Paints 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634-635. It is not without significance for that matter that in his written objection to the party list, annexure "E", the first respondent appears to accept that the list actually emanated from the first appellant. He has inserted by hand the name of the "National Independent Party (NIP)" as the party which had submitted the list in question. It is no doubt for that reason that he has seen it fit to join the first appellant in the application and also seeks costs against it.
[36] The first respondent's version, on the other hand, flies in the face of the party's own constitution. A few examples will suffice to highlight the point:-
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Section 4 of the constitution vests the supreme authority of the party in the National Conference of the party and not the President or Leader. Similarly, this section places the execution of the supreme authority of the party in the National Executive Committee and not the President or Leader.
Section 8.1 provides that the National Conference shall, being the supreme authority, lay the party's policy and manifesto. Properly construed, this would include a decision on whether or not the party list should include registered members only.
The powers of the National Executive Committee under section 8.2 include the power:-
To convene Annual National Conference and any other Special National Conference;
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To execute all resolutions passed by the National Conference or such other Special National Conference as may be held.
[37] Unlike the President or Leader, the Secretary General of the first appellant has wide ranging powers which are directly relevant to the inquiry at hand. Section 11.1.4 of the constitution lists such powers as follows, namely, that he/she:-
"(i) Shall be responsible for minutes of the National Executive Committee and of general conferences;
(iii) Shall receive, acknowledge and endorse all correspondence of the Party;
(iii) Shall be the Public Relation Officer of the Party;
(iv) Shall be responsible for general information of the Party."
As the official who is responsible for keeping the minutes of the party general conference as well as
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being responsible for the party correspondence and general information, the third appellant clearly has first hand knowledge of the resolutions made by the party and its NEC.
[38] By contrast, section 11.1.1 of the constitution confers very different, non-executive powers on the President or Leader of the first appellant. It reads:-
"11.1.1 President
(i) Shall be the Leader of the Party;
(ii) Shall see that the Constitution of the party and regulations are followed by all members."
[39] Despite the clear terms of the first appellant's constitution as set out above, the first respondent wrote to the Chief Electoral Officer in the IEC on 16 January 2007 and said the following:-
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"Regarding Rumoured LCD-NIP Election Pact
I wrote to advise you not to accommodate representations regarding NIP election symbols, candidate and party lists, as well as any other matter that would have a bearing on the participation of NIP in the forth-coming elections, except those endorsed by me - Anthony Clovis Manyeli -President of the party. Authentication of NIP representations shall be by the attachment of my signature on documents presented or by a confirmation letter signed by me otherwise.
This request is precipitated by recent unfortunate developments within NIP and my desire to ensure that the cardinal principles governing Lesotho elections are not violated by my Party.
I'll appreciate your expeditious confirmation of receipt of this advice, confirmation that NIP has been registered for the coming elections with its known symbols, and your assurance that you will heed the advice.
I remain,
A.C. Manyeli
President – NIP
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Copies: Chairman - IEC
Director of Elections
Leaders of Political Parties
Registered with the IEC" (Emphasis added.)
It appears that the first respondent seeks to place himself above the party's National Conference as well as the National Executive
Committee. He seems to contend that the party list should be endorsed by himself. This is contrary to the authority conferred on the party structures. Such a contention is in conflict with the party's constitution. More particularly it is inconsistent with the democratic goals set out in section 2.1 thereof, namely:-
"2.1 The party shall strive for democratic government of Basotho Nation founded upon spiritual principles and to this end, to educate Basotho in the principles of democratic system of government.”
[40] It remains to point out that the learned Judge a quo articulates a questionable approach when testing the respective versions of the parties before her. While she rejected the appellants' case on the
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ground that no party resolution had been annexed to their papers, she does not subject the first respondent to similar critical analysis. This, despite the fact that the latter did not have a party resolution in his favour and was not supported by a single deponent from the first respondent's NEC or any other qualified person. As the applicant in the court below, the first respondent had to establish a persuasive prima facie case and not the third appellant. She became the target of an attack by the learned Judge a quo in the circumstances which appears to us to be unjustified by the evidence before her. As will be recalled, this deponent was unfairly accused of pursuing her own personal agenda at the expense of the party. Evidence shows, however, that she discharged her executive duties as the Secretary General of the first appellant with propriety.
[41] It was for the aforegoing reasons that, after hearing submissions recorded above, this Court made the following order:-
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The Court is of the view that the decision of the High Court per Mahase A.J to grant the applicant a default judgment as against the 1st and the fifth respondents and entering such judgment as prayed for by the applicant was irregular and of no force and effect It follows that this Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal against the court orders.
We are also of the view that the High Court was wrong in confirming the rule nisi dated the 29th of January 2007 and to order the appellants (respondents in the court below) to pay the costs of suit
We have at the request of the parties considered the merits of the issues raised in the application. We are of the view that the High Court erred in directing the 1st and fifth respondents in the court below to accept the party list submitted by the applicant in the court below as "the only proper, legitimate and final party list of the fourth respondent"
This Court confirms that the only authentic party list is that submitted to the 1st respondent (in the court below) by the 3rd appellant on behalf of the 1st
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appellant. (Third Respondent and First Respondent respectiuety in the High Court).
It follows that the appeal succeeds . The apptioant (1st respondent in this Court) is to pay the costs of suit bath in the High Court and this Court"
JUDGE OF APPEAL
I agree PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL
I agree N. MAJARA
JUDGE
DELIVERED AT MASERU THIS 21st DAY OF FEBRUARY 2007.
FOR FIRST APPELLANT : ADV.Z.MDA
FOR SECOND AND THIRD APPELLANTS : ADV. S. PHAFANE FOR FIRST RESPONDENT : MR. M.NTLHOKI
(With him Adv. L. Mofihkoane)
