CIV/APN/298/06
IN THE HIGH COURT OF LESOTHO
In the matter between:
THATO LEFU APPLICANT
and
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIOS RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Delivered by the Honourable Madam Justice N. Majara on the 21st September 2006
This is an opposed application for bail wherein the petitioner is facing a charge of murder. Applicant submits that it is in the best interests of justice that he be admitted on bail for the reasons that as he avers, he is the sole bread winner of his family whose wife is expecting their second baby.
The crown opposes the application on the ground that if released on bail, applicant might kill other people whom he has allegedly threatened as is contained in the opposing affidavit filed by No. 9282 D/TPR 'MEKELELI.
1
In his submissions, Mr Shale for applicant argued that considerations that the Courts have taken into account in deciding bail applications
include the following:
(i) Likelihood to abscond.
(ii) How prejudicial it might be for the Applicant in all circumstances to be kept in custody by being denied bail.
(iii) Whether there is any reasonable likelihood that the accused will tamper with witnesses or interfere with the relevant evidence or cause such evidence to be suppressed or distorted.
I do accept all the above as true but for purposes of the present application, the only ground of opposition raised by the crown is that if released on bail, applicant might carry out his threat and kill other people.
At paragraphs 4 and 5 of his Opposing Affidavit, the deponent averred as follows:
"Facts herein are denied as on that same day, the Applicant was not at his home but he was at Quthing Mount Moorosi where he shot the deceased. In our investigations, we were told that by the Applicant's family members that he once said he would do something bad. After Nthati was killed, the Applicant called another sister of his wife, he told her that he killed Nthati, and is on his way to kill her, as well as his own wife.
The same sister of his wife showed us the cell phone number that the Applicant called her with,
2
and that number was found to be that of Applicant This we confirmed when we phoned him and told him to come to the police station and he did obliged, (sic) he came on the 24th July 2006 and we seized the cell phone. The cell phone number is (+266)58416093."
In his reply applicant averred as follows:
"Save to admit that I went to the Police Station and the police seized my phone, contents herein are denied and Deponent put to the proof thereof I aver that the Police showed me a number which they alleged I used to threaten my wife's sister. I aver that I have not threatened my wife's sister as alleged at all. In fact I was told by her that the deceased had been shot and I was shocked to the morrow (sic)."
It is trite that the overriding factor in bail applications is whether if an applicant is released on bail the interests of justice will not be prejudiced. All the considerations that counsel has raised as well as several others are but guidelines to assist the Court in the determination of this main and overall consideration.
I therefore do not agree with the submission made on behalf of applicant that simply because it has not been shown that the applicant has resisted arrest or has absconded or attempted to flee that is all the Court should take into account all other considerations notwithstanding. I have already stated that the
3
interests of justice can be prejudiced due to a number of factors and the ones mentioned by Counsel are not the be all and end all of considerations in bail applications.
Be that as it may, as Mr Shale correctly submitted, the opposing affidavit of the police officer is not accompanied by any supporting affidavit so that most of his averments are merely hearsay. In my view this is negligence on the part of the crown. In addition, the crown failed to provide the Court with the telephone printouts as they promised.
Yet, I also wish to add that the same is the case with the reply of the applicant who averred that he first heard about the deceased's death from the very person whom the crown has cited as being one of those people he allegedly threatened to kill as well. He too failed to file the wife's sister's supporting affidavit to verify his averments and to negate the crown's allegations.
That being the case, the Court has to determine this application with unsubstantiated averments from both sides. As I have stated in earlier cases, Courts have been warned not to treat an application for bail as if it is the trial itself. In my opinion, this means that a bail application is more of an enquiry than it is a trial so that the rules of evidence and procedure cannot be strictly applied. See my comments in
4
Morakabi Phakoe and 3 Others v Director of Public Prosecutions CRI/APN/109/06 (unreported).
Against this background I proceed to consider whether in casu, applicant can be released on bail without the interests of justice being prejudiced. Whilst I agree with Mr Shale that the averments contained in the opposing affidavit have not been substantiated, I also take into account that these were made by a peace officer under oath. The deponent further stated that one of his informants is the sister of applicant's wife and that they i.e. the police, called applicant on the same number they were given by her and told him to come to the police station and the latter obliged.
The investigating officer having made such serious allegations, the burden shifted on the applicant to show on a balance of probabilities
that his release on bail would not defeat the ends of justice. In his replying affidavit applicant denied having made the threats and also showed that it is actually the very same person (his wife's sister) who informed him about the death of the deceased which at the material time he knew nothing about.
He however admitted that he went to the police station on the stated day but did not tell the Court how he came to know he was supposed to report or who called him to do so which he
5
ought to have done since the investigating officer averred that he reported himself at the police station as a result of their having called him on the very number they were given by the sister he allegedly threatened. He merely admitted that he did go to the Police station.
It is therefore my view that since this averment (of the investigating officer) was made to support the one that applicant had made the alleged threats on the said cell phone, he ought to have successfully shown that this was not the case. His failure to do only served to strengthen the averments made by Detective Trooper 'Mekeleli in his opposing affidavit notwithstanding the fact as I have already shown, that the latter's averments were not supported by any other evidence on affidavit.
I cannot therefore turn a blind eye to such a serious allegation of threats to other people lives the shortcomings of the crown's evidence notwithstanding more especially because the police officer deposed to the fact that some of the information came from the applicant's own family. It is my belief that the interests of justice would be prejudiced.
It was also applicant's case that his wife is expecting the couple's second child which fact per his contention constitutes an exceptional
circumstance entitling him to be released on
6
bail. This was not denied by respondents. Indeed, as Mr Shale correctly submitted, it has been stated in numerous authorities that the term exceptional circumstances has no magical or hidden meaning. However, it is my view that the term requires applicant to show that there exists something out of the ordinary that would compel the Court to release him on bail. See my comments in Tefetso Lenea v DPP CRI/APN/517/04 (unreported).
It is my considered opinion that expectancy of a baby by a wife is not strictly speaking an exceptional circumstance unless it can be shown that there exists some other factor that would require extra care-giving by the husband. I am aware that most women normally go through their pregnancy and I might add labour, without any complications and usually in the absence of their husbands without
any problems so that there is nothing exceptional about this factor per se.
If applicant had at least shown that it is imperative that he be with his wife whilst she is in hospital or that she is sickly or having certain complications necessitating his presence and assistance, that might have constituted an exceptional circumstance. In the absence of such evidence, I do not accept that applicant has successfully discharged this responsibility.
7
It is my opinion that on a balance of probabilities, the Crown has successfully made out their case that if released on bail, applicant
might indeed carry out his death threats thus prejudicing the interests of justice.
For these reasons, the application for bail is refused but with the rider that the Crown should expedite prosecution of this case within at least three months from the date of judgment failing which applicant is free to approach the Court to renew his application.
N. MAJARA
JUDGE
For applicant : Mr Shale
For respondent: Ms Motinyane
8