HIGH COURT OF LESOTHO
Joseph Nkeane Petitioner
of Public Prosecutions Respondent
by the Honourable Mr Justice T. E. Monapathi on Thursday 15th June,
question was whether there were exceptional circumstances in this
bail application in terms of section 109(A) of the Criminal
and Evidence Act 1991 (as amended) (the CP& E).
with Mr Molapo that in certain cases the facts in a bail application
will show that an applicant, who is accused, does have
defence. In the instant case Applicant said he acted in self-defence.
This is a matter that (if apparent) can be approached
by the court in
two (2) ways.
primarily to determine if facts disclose a good defence. A good
defence being a defence which is arguable on the one hand.
other hand there being a defence which looks so good that it is
highly probable that the trial court will believe the Accused.
is the kind of situation, and the latter, where the court has to
conclude that there is an exceptional circumstance. It is
circumstance that may lead the court to conclude that the further
detention of an accused becomes an injustice.
respondent submitted that the court should find that the petitioner
has not complied with the requirements of the relevant section
that the mere saying by him that he has asthma is not in any way
evidence if nothing more is said or shown as proof thereof.
the mere fact that he has asthma and a minor child does not show how
his circumstances should he taken as exceptional.
See Pheello Senatla
vD.P.P CIR/APN/191/2004 19th August, 2004, Lehlohonolo Kelane vD.P.P
held in CRI/APN/191/2004 above that where the court is told nothing
exceptional about the circumstances of an applicant,
unnecessary to even consider whether they would entitle him to
release in the interest of justice. It held further that
circumstances it (the court) was enjoyed by law to keep him in
custody until the law had taken it course. The bail was
refused. I have with respect to follow the decisions.
exceptional circumstances where if an accused has a very good defence
which (circumstances) are appropriate and which
the court will say
are satisfactory in terms of the CP & E. I do not think that the
present case fits into latter category.
It may be, as Mr
was forced to concede, that the defence is arguable hut not
otherwise. Even though the Applicant affirmed on oath that he
intention of absconding this court had nevertheless to look at all
the circumstances. See S v Hudson 1980 (4) SA 145 (D).
I was forced
to at look one of them for the present purposes.
circumstances of the conduct of the Accused after the event of the
evening of the shooting of the Deceased indicates that he
away for two (2) weeks. He only came back after persuasion by his
lawyer. This is typical of a [light risk. This is the
kind of man who
is likely to abscond. Indeed there are other factors which are
equally weighty. See also S v Acheson 1991 (2) SA.
805 (Nm) at
822A-J, 823 A-C
has now been indicted. He has committed a serious offence. I am
mindful of the principle that I must not refuse bail merely
crime is serious. In my discretion the factor of
being a demonstrated flight risk leads me to a conclusion that he
ought to be denied bail. I so order.
Applicant: Mr Molapo
Crown: Miss Dlhangamandla
African Law (AfricanLII)
Ghana Law (GhaLII)
Laws of South Africa (Legislation)
Lesotho Law (LesLII)
Liberian Law (LiberLII)
Malawian Law (MalawiLII)
Namibian Law (NamibLII)
Nigerian Law (NigeriaLII)
Sierra Leone Law (SierraLII)
South African Law (SAFLII)
Seychelles Law (SeyLII)
Swaziland Law (SwaziLII)
Tanzania Law (TanzLII)
Ugandan Law (ULII)
Zambian Law (ZamLII)
Zimbabwean Law (ZimLII)
Commonwealth Countries' Law
LII of India
United States Law