IN THE HIGH COURT OF LESOTHO In the
KHAUOE THABANG KHAUOE Applicant
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 1st Respondent
BERENG SEEISO 2nd Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Delivered by the Honourable Acting Judge Mr JusticeEnoch Dumbutshena on the 12th day of September, 1995
This application was brought to Court by Notice of
Motion praying for a declaratory order in the following terms:
That the Act No.10, The Office of King(Reinstatement
of Former King) Act, 1994 bedeclared null and void.
That any act which may have been madepursuant to
this Act No.10 of 1994 bedeclared null and void.
That the Respondent be ordered to pay thecosts of
4. That the applicant be granted such further
and/or alternative relief".
Briefly the facts of this case are as follows: The King
of Lesotho was King Moshoeshoe II. During March 1990 the ruling
removed him from the office of King and Head of
State. This was done in terms of Order 14 of 1990. There was a
vacancy. The College
of Chiefs designated Prince Mohato as King of
Lesotho. He became King Letsie III. Meanwhile the Military Council
had exiled his father
to England. In mid 1992 King Moshoeshoe II
returned to Lesotho.
In the meantime King Letsie III had, from his
enthronement, decided to give up the throne on the return of his
father to Lesotho.
In December 1994 King Letsie III became away that the
College of Chiefs had designated his father King of Lesotho and Head
At the same time the National Assembly had passed a law
"The Office of King (Reinstatement of former King) Act 1994."
No.10 of 1994) It was for the reinstatement of the King and it
made provision for King Letsie III's succession to the throne. On
January 1995 King Letsie III left the throne and his father was
reinstated to his former position of King of Lesotho and Head
Subsequent to the filing of the Notice of Motion the Law
Society of Lesotho applied for the Society to be joined as an
these proceedings. The application was refused. This
application was followed by two others. Prince Mohato
Bereng Seeiso's application was allowed but that of
Chieftainess Mantoetse Lesaoana Peete was rejected. Prince Mohato
was joined as second respondent. Chieftainess Peete a
member of the College of Chiefs was said to have no locus stand. The
was informed from the Bar that she appealed against that
decision. On 7 July, 1995 this matter was set down for hearing on 7
8 September, 1995.
Mr. Tampi, with him Mr Makhethe, for first respondent,
applied for the postponement of the hearing to 14 and 15 September
Mr De Bruin, with whom Mr Olivier appeared for second
respondent and Mr Matooane, for the applicant, objected to
Matooane told the Court that the applicant had no
prior notice of first respondent's intention to apply for a
postponement. Mr. De
Bruin indicated that his client had been advised
by the first respondent of his intention to apply for a postponement
of the hearing.
The reasons for wanting postponement given to second
respondent's legal representatives were different from those advanced
Second respondent's attorneys wrote a letter to first
respondent asking for substantial reasons for wanting to postpone the
of the case to 7 and 8 September. Second respondent did not
reply to that letter. Now new and different reasons from those
when first respondent first expressed his desire to apply
for a postponement have been advanced in court.
It is now said that first respondent briefed senior
counsel in the Republic of South Africa. He cannot attend to day's
hearing because he is engaged in another matter in South
Africa. Mr. Tampi informed the court from the Bar that he had sent
to the said senior counsel and no replies had been
received. On 5 September Mr Tampi telephoned the said senior counsel
before the hearing of the matter. Counsel advised him to
apply for a postponement. It is doubtful that counsel would have
Mr Tampi of his inability to attend the hearing on 7 and 8
September and his desire to have the matter postponed to a convenient
day had Mr Tampi not telephoned him.
The second reason for seeking a postponement was that
Chieftainess Peete had filed a notice of appeal in the Court of
is appealing against this Court's refusal to join her in
these proceedings. Mr. Tampi contended that it would be inconvenient
hear and determine the application before her application was
heard and determined by the Court of Appeal. This would have been a
good and substantial reason for applying for a postponement. However
the Court was informed by Mr. De Bruin that Chieftainess Peete
the process of withdrawing her Notice of Appeal.
In the exercise of my discretion I dismissed the
application and indicated that I would give reasons in this judgment.
Here are the
(1) It appeared to me that the first respondent was
not serious about wanting the
postponement of the hearing to a later date. He did not
have substantial reasons. First respondent should have realised that
counsel he was briefing was not interested. He did not
reply to fax messages sent to him. Had Mr Tampi not telephoned him on
1995 he may not have informed first respondent of his
inability to attend the trial on 7 and 8 September 1995.
The dates of the hearing of this matter wereannounced
to the parties on 7 July 1995.All parties knew on that day that
the matterhad been set down for hearing on 7 and 8September.
It seems to me, assumingeverything went wrong, that not
much effortwas taken to engage the services of seniorcounsel
The fact that the applicant was not advisedof first
respondent's intention to apply forpostponement and that he was
only informedon the day the matter was heard is a factorI
considered in rejecting the application.
The Parties are all in Maseru and theirlegal
practitioners are in Maseru. It would
have been easy for first respondent to inform them of
his intention to ask the Court for postponement or to agree on
convenient to all the parties. In this case first and
second respondents are on the same side. I believe first respondent
readily cooperated with second respondent. And the fact
that senior counsel was only contacted on 5th September makes me to
that the application was not bona fide.
read the papers it did not appear to
me that first respondent would suffer any prejudice were
the application refused. The first respondent was represented by Mr.
and the second respondent was represented by Mr. De Bruin. The
two respondents were more or less arguing the same points. The two
respondents will benefit from each others' submissions.
(6) Although it is proper to allow anapplication
for postponement especially thefirst time it is made, I was of
the viewthat the first respondent would not sufferany
prejudice while the applicant could beprejudiced by the
postponement and that no
order of costs would adequately compensate him. Besides
the matter was causing uncertainty in the country.
See Myburgh Transport v Botha +/a S.A. Truck Bodies 1991
(3) S.A. 310 at 314 G-315J.
In this case the question of locus standi is paramount.
The respondents allege that applicant has no locus standi. In his
affidavit the applicant says he has locus standi and
describes himself as follows:
"I am a citizen of Lesotho by birth and I am at
present forty-six years of age. As at the time of making this
affidavit I have
not been disqualified to register as an elector in
terms of Section 57 (3) hence I qualify to vote or to be registered
as an elector
in elections of the National Assembly as envisaged by
section 57 and 85 (3) of the Constitution.
I have a Constitutional right under section 85 (3) of
the Constitution to vote for the approval of the bill, now Act No.10
As a private citizen, apart from the Constitutional
right vested upon me by section 85 (3) of the Constitution, it is my
right to uphold the Constitution, of this Country and to do
everything legal to protect the same,
In my capacity as an attorney of the Courts of Lesotho,
I have taken an oath to uphold the laws of this Country and to
If the declaratory order, as prayed is. not. granted,
not only that I will be allowing the infrigment of the Constitution,
Law, which I have to uphold and protect, but as an
attorney, I will be allowing myself to be in alignment with illegal
to my oath."
In his written heads of argument Mr. Matooane submits
that in order to determine whether applicant has locus standi or not
the Court should first determine whether Act 10 of 1994
should have been passed in accordance with the provisions of ;Section
not. He argued that if the Act was not passed' by Parliament in
terms of section 85 (3) of the Constitution then Act No.10 of 1994
infringed upon applicant's rights as a qualified voter as envisaged
by section 85 of the Constitution. This fact alone would be
to entitle applicant to come to Court.
Applicant asserted in his affidavit that he had a
constitutional right to vote in order to approve the passing of Act
No. 10 of 1994.
In terms of section 85 (3) of the Constitution if a
Bill amends any of the provisions mentioned in paragraph (a) of
including section 45, before the Bill is submitted to
the King for his assent it must be submitted to the vote of the
applicant alleged that at the time of making his
affidavit he was not disqualified to register as an elector in terms
57 (3) so he qualified to vote or to be registered as an
elector in elections of the National Assembly as envisaged by
and 85 (3) of the Constitution.
Section 57 (3) reads:
"(3) No person shall be qualified to be registered
as an elector in elections to the National Assembly who, at the date
application to be registered -
(a) is, by virtue of his own act.
under any acknowledgement of allegiance, obedience or
adherence to any foreign power or state, or
is under sentence of deathimposed on him by any
court inLesotho; or
is, under any law in force inLesotho, adjudged or
otherwisedeclared to be of unsound mind."
It was contended on behalf of the applicant that the
fact that applicant was qualified to vote or was an elector gave him
because he is also an attorney and a protector of the
Constitution which was infringed by the passing of Act No.10 of 1994.
It is difficult to understand how a person, if I am to
believe the sworn facts in his affidavit, who is not yet registered
as a voter
can be deprived of his constitutional right to vote and
how that fact alone gives him locus standi in this case.
Mr. Matooane, however, contended that if Act 10 of 1994
received royal assent contrary to section 85 (3) therefore any
may seek relief from the Court. He asserted that
Act 10 of 1994 was not submitted to voters and yet it
altered section 45 (1) and (2) of the Constitution. I fail to
Mr. Matooane comes to that conclusion without the
benefit of evidence of non-submission of the Act to the voters and
without a clear
understanding of what was altered or amended by Act
No. 10 of 1994. The facts in the founding affidavit do not lend
support to this
Besides there is nowhere in applicant's affidavit were
reference is made to the proviso to subsection (3) of Section 85
"Provided that if the bill does not alter any of
the provisions mentioned in paragraph (a) and is supported at the
in each House of Parliament by the votes of no less than
two-thirds of all the members of that House it shall not be necessary
submit the bill to the vote of the electors."
Mr. Matooane argued that if an amendment was made by
Parliament to section 45 of the Constitution without complying with
(3) any qualified voter may seek relief from this Court.
To support his contention he referred to the Minister of Interior and
v Harris and Others 1952 (4) S.A. 769 (AD) . He submitted
that the sections considered by the Appellate Division in that case
similar to section 85 (3).
Section 152 of the South African Constitution at that
time provided that: "Parliament may by law repeal or alter any
of this Act" The second proviso to section 152
"No repeal or alteration of the provisions
contained in this section .... or in secs. 35 and 137 shall be valid
unless the Bill
embodying such repeal or alteration shall be passed
by both Houses of Parliament sitting together, and at the third
reading be agreed
upon by not less than two-thirds of the total
number of members of both Houses."
There was at that time in South Africa the struggle by
government to remove coloured voters from the common roll in the Cape
The coloured voters resisted government attempts. The
Courts were called upon to protect the interests of the coloured
rights as voters were constitutionally protected. They
could not be removed from the voters roll unless through a method
by the second proviso to section 152 of the South African
Constitution. Parliament passed the High Court of Parliament Act, 35
1952. It was passed bicamerally instead of the Senate and the
House of Assembly sitting together as required by law. It was wrong
for Parliament to infringe the prescriptions in the second proviso to
In Minister of the Interior and Another v. Harris and
Others, supra, at 779 E-G Centlirres C.J. remarked as follows:
"It is clear from secs. 35,137 and 152 of the
Constitution that certain rights are conferred on individuals and
that these rights
cannot be abolished or restricted unless the
procedure prescribed by sec. 152 is followed. In construing these
sections it is important
to bear in mind that these sections give the
individual the right to call on the judicial power to help him resist
or executive action which offends against these
sections or, to put it in another way, these sections contain
creating rights in individuals, the duty of
the Courts, where the question arises in litigation, being to ensure
that the protection
of the guarantee is made effective, unless and
until it is modified by legislation in such a form as under the
Constitution can validly
effect such modification."
I agree with Mr De Bruin that the above passage tends to
support respondents' case. In Minister of the Interior and Another v
& Others, supra, Parliament acted contrary to the second
proviso to section 152 cited above. In the instant case the applicant
did not tell the Court how Act No.10 of 1994 was passed. Parliament
might have complied with the proviso to section 85 (3). What
is that Act 10 of 1994 did not amend or repeal section 45 of the
The South African Parliament by acting unlawfully
infringed constitutionally guaranteed rights given by section 35, 137
and 152 of
the South African Constituion. The Courts were called
upon to protect those rights. In the instant case no
rights were infringed by the passing of Act 10 of 1994. There is
justification for bringing an action to court asking for
relief for something that did not happen.
It is difficult to come to the conclusion that the
applicant was a registered voter or just a person qualified to be
a voter. He did not reply to allegations made by second
respondent in his answering affidavit. The allegations were neither
nor explained by applicant. The question whether he was
qualified to be registered or was a registered voter remains
To be an elector one must be a registered voter. Section
57 (5) reads:
"57(5) Subject to the provisions of subsections (6)
and (7), every person who is registered in any constituency as an
in elections to the National Assembly shall be qualified to
vote in such elections in that constituency in accordance with the
of any law in that behalf; and no other person may so
In any event being an elector, an attorney who swore an
oath to uphold the constitution and being a holder of any right
terms of section 85 (3) of the Constitution do not
15 qualify one for locus stand.
A person who wants to institute an action must only sue
on his own behalf. The right or interest which he seeks to enforce or
must be available to him personally. In the instant case
the person who wants to institute an action must personally have an
in the succession to the kingship. In AAIL (SA) v. Muslim
judicial Council 1983 (4) S.A. 855 (CPD) at 863H - 864A Tebbutt J
"It is clear that in our law a person who sues must
have an interest in the subject-matter of the suit and that such
must be a direct one (see Dalyrymple and Others v. Colonial
Treasurer 1910 TS 372). In P E Bosman Transport Works Committee and
v. Piet Bosman Transport (Pty) Ltd 1980 (4) SA 801 (T) at
804B, Eloff J states that: 'It is well settled that, in order to
its participation in a suit such as the present, a party....
has to show that it has a direct and substantial interest in the
and outcome of the application'.
The learned Judge cited with approval the view expressed
in Henri Viljoen (Pty) Ltd v. Awerbuch Brothers 1953 (2) SA 151 (0),
by Corbert J in United Watch & Diamond Co (Pty) Ltd and
Others v. Disa Hotels Ltd and Another 1972 (4) SA 409 (C), that the
of a 'direct and substantial interest'
connoted 'an interest in the right which is the
subject-matter of the litigation'. Corbertt J went on to say at 415H:
'This view of what constitutes a direct and substantial
interest has been referred to and adopted in a number of subsequent
including two in this Division... and it is generally
accepted that what is required is a legal interest in the
the action which would be prejudicially affected by
the judgment of the Court'."
See also Lesotho Human Rights Alert Group v. The
Minister of Justice and Human Rights; the Director of Prisons and the
C. of A. (Civ) No. 27/94 at 8 - 9.
The fact that applicant is an attorney, a citizen of
Lesotho and whatever does not give him a direct or substantial
interest in the
succession to the Office of the King of Lesotho. This
is not a case where the liberty of the subject is involved in which
can be brought by a person who has no direct or substantial
interest in the subject-matter. The subject-matter in this case is
succession to the Office of the King. See Lesotho Human Rights
Alert Group v. Minister of Justice and Others (supra) at 9., Wood
Others v. Ondangwa Tribal Authority and Another 1975 (2) SA 294 (A)
at 306G - 307C.
I agree with Mr Tampi in his contention that the
interest in the case must be recognised by law. In the instant case
second respondent or any other person in the line of
succession could have objected, had there been justification for
the designation of the King. In fact section 45 (5)
specifies the person with the right to object. It provides:
"45 (5) Where any person has been designated to
succeed to the office of King in pursuance of subsection (1) or (2),
person who claims that, under the customary law of Lesotho,
he should have been so designated in place of that person may, by
made to the High Court within a period of six months
commencing with the day on which the designation was published in the
apply to have the designation varied by the substitution of
his own name for that of the first mentioned person, but save as
in this Chapter, the designation of any person for the
purposes of this section shall not otherwise be called in question in
court on the ground that, under the customary law of Lesotho, the
person designated was not entitled to be so designated."
It is clear from a reading of subsection (5) of Section
45 that the person entitled to object to a succession to the office
King of Lesotho has himself a right to succeed the King. He
must have an interest or substantial interest in the succession. His
interest is his entitlement to the succession to the Office of the
King of Lesotho.
Subsection (5) of Section 45 provides an answer to Mr.
Matooane's reasons for claiming locus standi in this case. He
Act 10 of 1994 had altered Section 45 (1) and (2) of
the Constitution by amending Customary Law. Therefore his client as
had to uphold the Constitution. And that constitutes an
interest entitling him to bring a case to this Court. His being an
creates an interest in the matter of succession, as any
other citizen of Lesotho will have that interest. There was no merit
Act 10 of 1994 did not amend or alter Section 45 (1) and
(2). In fact subsection (5) of Section 45 makes it clear that a
cannot be challenged on the ground that "under the
customary law of Lesotho, the person designated was not entitled to
The applicant's contention that the former King
Moshoeshoe II, in terms of section 45 (1) and (2) could not succeed
to the office
of the King of Lesotho because the only successor to
the office of the King of Lesotho is his son, King Letsie III, falls
the designation of any person for the purpose of section
45 "shall not otherwise be called in question in any court on
that, under the customary law of Lesotho, the person
designated was not entitled to be designated."
Even if I were to assume that the applicant, for the
reasons that he advanced in support of his claim is able to bring an
Court challenging the designation of the former King,
had locus standi, the Constitution which he claims to
defend and protect does not support his contention.
It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that the
former King could only ascend to the throne in accordance with the
of section 45 of the Constitution, that is, through
designation by the College of Chiefs if there was a vacancy in the
King and not by Act No.10 of 1994.
The circumstances that led to the designation of King
Moshoeshoe II by the College of Chiefs and the succession of the King
throne are well documented in the answering affidavit of
second respondent and supported by the affidavits of Chieftainess
Annexure "A", the affidavit of Chief Lehloenya,
Annexure "B" and those of other chiefs whose allegations
applicant did not deny or reply to in any manner.
The total effect of the case put up by the second
respondent is that everything was done in terms of Section 45 (l) and
(2) of the
Constitution. There is ample supporting evidence.
Section 45 (1) and (2) provides:
"(1) The College of Chiefs may at any time
designate, in accordance with the customary law of Lesotho, the
person (or the persons,
in order of prior right) who are entitled to
succeed to the office of King upon the death
of the holder of, or the occurrence of any vacancy in,
that office and if on such death or vacancy, there is a person who
been designated in pursuance of this section and who
is capable under the customary law of Lesotho of succeeding to that
that person (or, if there is more than one such person, that
one of them who has been designated as having the first right to
to the office) shall become King.
(2) If, on the death of the holder of, or the occurrence
of any vacancy in, the office of King, there is no person who becomes
under subsection (1), the College of Chiefs shall, with all
practical speed and in accordance with the customary law of Lesotho,
proceed to designate a person to succeed to the office of King and
the person so designated shall thereupon become King."
In my view this case must be decided on the undisputed
facts in the answering affidavit of second respondent and the
sworn to by members of the College of Chiefs. I
summarise below some of the undisputed facts deposed to by second
some members of the College of Chiefs.
In paragraph 3.2 of his answering affidavit second
respondent deposed to having taken a decision that he held the throne
for his father
during his father's absence and urged the Military
Council and the present Government to reinstate his father to the
he abdicated the throne on 25 January 1995 on the basis
that his father would be reinstated in terms of the law of the land
In paragraph 4.1 he said the College of Chiefs
designated his father, King Moshoeshoe II, as King of Lesotho. At the
same time the
National Assembly had passed Act No.10 of 1994.
As mentioned above these averments were supported or
corroborated by members of the College of Chiefs, Chieftainess Peete,
in paragraph 7.1 of her affidavit to knowing second
respondent's desire to abdicate the throne upon the return of his
paragraph 6.1 she said: "We were in agreement that
whenever King Moshoehsoe II returns to the country, he would resume
as holder of the Office of King, All chiefs were in
It was argued on behalf of the applicant that Customary
Law was not followed in the designation of King Moshoeshoe II.
Peete said it was as did many other members of the
College of Chiefs. (I remark as follows that even if it were not
followed it would
not entitle the applicant to locus standi).
She said in paragraph 7.2 of her affidavit: "In
1994, the College of Chiefs resolved as per annexure
"MPLI" according to which we designated in accordance with
45 (1) and (2) of the Constitution, King Moshoeshoe II to the
throne as King and Head of State. This document where my signature
appears next to number 14 is a true copy of the original that was
afterwards handed to the Minister of Home Affairs (responsible
Chieftainship and Local Government Affairs), for the purpose of
informing government of the designation, and to have it published
the Government Gazette." Chief Lehloenya age 78 years deposed in
his affidavit in similar terms.
The matters and allegations of facts in second
respondent's answering affidavit and supporting affidavits were not
disputed by the
applicant or contradicted. The applicant for some
reason regarded them as matters of law. There was, therefore, no
Those facts must in my view be accepted by the
court. They are in my view overwhelming and compelling. It would be
wrong in notice
of motion proceedings to grant the relief prayed for
by the applicant under these circumstances. See Pascon - Evans Paints
Riebeeck Paints 1984 (3) SA 623 at 634 E-H where Corbett JA,
as he then was, said:
".... the affidavits reveal certain disputes of
fact. The appellant nevertheless sought a final interdict, together
relief, on the papers and without resort to oral
evidence. In such a case the general rule was stated by Van Wyk J
(with whom De
Villiers JP and Rosenow J
concurred) in Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery Ltd v.
Stellenvale Winery (Pty) Ltd 1957 (4) SA 234 (C) at 235E-G, to be:
.... where there is dispute as to the facts a final
interdict should only be granted in notice of motion proceedings if
as stated by the respondents together with the admitted
facts in the applicant's affidavits justify such an order .... Where
clear that facts, though not formally admitted, cannot be
denied, they must be regarded as admitted.'
This rule has been referred to several times by this
Court (see Burn-kloof Caterers (Pty) Ltd v Horseshoe Caterers (Green
Ltd 1976 (2) SA 398 A-B; Tamarillo (Pty) Ltd v. B N
Aitkin (Pty) Ltd 1982 (1) SA 398 (A) at 430-1; Associated South
(Pty) Ltd v. Oryx & Vereinigte Backereien (Pty)
Ltd en Andere 1982 (3) SA 893 (A) at 923G-924D) . It seems to me,
this formulation of the general rule, and particularly
the second sentence thereof, requires some clarification and,
It is correct that, where in proceedings on
notice of motion disputes of fact have arisen on the affidavits, a
final order, whether
it be an interdict or some other form of relief,
may be granted if those facts averred in the applicant's affidavits
which have been
admitted by the respondent, together with the facts
alleged by the respondent, justify such an order."
Mr. De Bruin pointed out in his argument that popularis
actio of the Roman Law which recognised the right of a private
bring an action to Court on behalf of other people without
injury to himself was no longer recognised both in Roman Law and in
law. The person who sues must himself have an interest in the
subject matter of the action and that interest must be a direct and
substantial one. The exception is where the liberty of an individual
is involved when the Court allows a relation or a friend to
action on his behalf. See Wood and Others v. Ondangwa Tribal
Authority and Another, 1975 (2) SA 294 at 306G - 307C, Lesotho
Rights Alert Group v. The Minister of Justice & Human Rights &
others, supra, at 9.
To be fair to the applicant there was no claim made on
his behalf that he was bringing the action on behalf of an
association or the
nation at large. He claims his entitlement to
prosecuting his action on the ground that he is a citizen of Lesotho,
a voter and an
attorney sworn to protect the Constitution. He has
failed to make a case that entitles him to bring an action to this
Court on the
ground that he has a direct interest in the
subject-matter of the suit. Where in proceedings on notice of motion
the only reliable
evidence, uncontradicted or otherwise, is by the
respondent an order cannot be granted.
There is one more matter I would like to attend to
before closing this judgment. Mr. Matooane argued that it was a
disregard of the
Constitution to modify or alter Customary Law. Was
he right? Should customary law never be modified or altered?
I think not. Customary law by its very nature is subject
to modifications. It is a body of growing law which expands its
as civic society develops and expands. In any event
Parliament's duty is to make, amend and repeal laws. The making of
laws is in
the domain of the Legislature.
The Constitution of Lesotho provides for the
modification' of customary law. Section 154 (1) of the Constitution
law in these terms:
".... 'customary law' means the customary law of
Lesotho for the time being in force subject to any modification or
made in respect thereof by any Act of Parliament".
If Act No. 10 of 1994 had amended customary law, which
it did not, the Constitution empowers it to modify or amend it. The
of customary law cannot entitle the applicant to bring
an action in this Court. It does not give him locus standi. No right
has been ignored or infringed. He remains in this case without
a substantial interest.
Accordingly the applicant does not have locus standi in
judicio to bring an action or claim relief declaring Act No.10 of
any act which may have been made pursuant to Act No. 10 of
1994 null and void.
In the result the application is dismissed" with
costs including the costs of employing two counsel.
ENOCH DUMBUTSHENA ACTING JUDGE
12th September, 1995.
For Applicant - Mr. T.M. Matooaae
1st Respondent - Mr. K.R.K Tampi and Mr. T. Makhethe
2nd Respondent - Mr. De Bruin and Mr. W.H. Olivier
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