CIV/APN/194/86

IN THE HIGH COURT
OF LESOTHO In the matter of:

VISUAL PROBLEM CENTRE Applicant

v

THE STANDARD BANK (MASERU) 1st Respondent
HENRY
STELZER 2nd Respondent

JUDGMENT

Delivered by the Hon. Acting Mr. Justice D. S. LEVY on
the 30th day of June, 1986

Visual Problem Centre which is a customer of First
Respondent (the Bank) applies for an order directing the Bank to
allow certain
Ramabitsa who is the officer-in-charge of the affairs
of the Applicant to conduct its affairs in respect of the moneys
deposited
with the Bank on bahalf of the Applicant.

It is alleged by the Applicant that although there are
moneys of the Applicant held on deposit by the BAnk, the Bank has
repeatedly
refused to allow Ramabitsa to withdraw funds on bahalf of
the Applicant despite the fact that appropriate authority to her by
the
Applicant had been lodged with the Bank.

Before this application was brought, an application
number 136 of 1986 had been brought in this Court, by the Second
Respondent (Stelzer)
who was formerly an officer of the Applicant,
against the Applicant and Ramabitsa in which he claimed against them:

1. 
   An order for delivery of certain vehicles which
   were
   the property of the Applicant;

   
   

2. 
   That they deliver to him all the books and records
   of
   the Applicant;

   
   

/That........

-2-

3. That they allow him, his attorney and his accountant
to enter the premises of the Applicant to evaluate and take stock of
every
item of the Applicant and to inter­dict and bar Ramabitsa
from entering the premises of the Applicant.

The wide range of relief sought in this application was
for nothing less than a complete handing over of the affairs of the
Applicant
in these proceedings to Stelzer. That appli­cation
proved abortive,as in the result, on the 19th May 1986, it was
withdrawn
by Stelzer and he was ordered to pay the costs of the
proceedings. However in its attempt to

regain control of its affairs, the Applicant approached
the Bank to recognise its right to conduct Applicant's banking
account but
was refused such recognition. It is alleged by the
Applicant that such approach had been made both before and after the
abortive
application by Stelzer.

The Applicant alleges that Stelzer had in fact resigned
on the 5th April 1986 so that clearly from that date onwards he would
have
had no right or interest in the affairs of the Applicant. The
Applicant also says that an attempt was made to communicate with
Stelzer
through his attorney and through their intervention a letter
was written by Stelzer's attorneys to Barclays Bank indicating that
he had no interest in the account of the Applicant with that Bank.
No such letter has been placed before me, indicating a similar
attitude by Stelzer in respect of the Bank in this application.

In the result, the Applicant brings this application for
an order on the Bank directing it to allow the Applicant to conduct
its banking
account with the Bank and asking for an order for costs
on the attorney and client scale against the Bank. An order is also
sought
restraining the First Respondent from allowing Stelzer to
withdraw any moneys standing to the credit of the Applicant with the
Bank.

/As far ...

-3-

As far as costs against Stelzer are concerned, the
Applicant sought no order for costs against him unless he opposed the
application.
At that stage I am satisfied that there was more than
adequate justification for Applicant to have made the allegations it
did in
respect of Stelzer which were to the effect that it genuinely
believed and feared that Stelzer would continue to operate the
account
of the Applicant with the Bank notwithstanding his
resignation. The relief sought by Stelzer in his application is so
wide and so
unjustifiable that it could only lead to a fear that
notwithstanding his withdrawal of that application he might
nevertheless persist
in regarding himself as being in authority in
respect of the operation of the Applicant's accounts with the Bank.

I am informed from the bar by Counsel who appears on
behalf of Stelzer today that the attorney whose office had brought
Stelzer's
application did so without his authority and that the
allegations made therein were not authorised by him. That may be, but
unfortunately
Stelzer is fixed with respon­sibility for his
attorney's conduct of his affairs vis-a-vis the Applicant in this
matter and if
that attorney has so grossly overstated his client's
case against the Applicant, that it could lead the Applicant
reasonably to demand
that its affairs should not be left open to any
kind of attack by Stelzer, he must take the blame for what his
attorney has done
on his behalf.

Stelzer has opposed this application, not because any of
the relief sought against the Bank is opposed by him, or that he
claims any
right to the Bank account of the Applicant with the Bank
or any right to operate that account, but only clear his name in view
of
the allegations made by the Applicant

/in these ...

-4-

in these proceedings. I have already indicated that
what was said by the Applicant was that it genuinely believed and
feared that
he would continue to operate the account of the Applicant
with the Bank. And I have also indicated my view that that fear was
fully
justified in the light of the previous abortive proceedings.

It is true that a person whose name has been defamed in
Court proceedings most probably has the right to intervene in those
proceedings
in order to protect his name. But in this instance even
if the inference that Stelzer seeks to draw from the fact of his
joinder
in these proceedings is a justifiable one, and about which I
have some reservation, the allegation that was made was fully
justified
by the conduct of Stelzer through his attorney. In my view
there was a proper joinder of him in these proceedings and there was
by no means an excessive enlargement of the true facts for the
Applicant to have made the statements it did in these proceedings.

It is also a fact in these proceedings that no relief was sought
against Stelzer and costs were asked against him only in the event
of
him appearing to oppose. He has done that and he has done that
unsuccessfully in my view.

In so far as the costs are concerned, the Bank has not
opposed the matter at all but I see no reason why it should not pay
the costs
of these proceedings up to the grant of the order that I am
going to make.

I will therefore order the Bank to pay the Applicant's
costs on the basis of an unopposed application and I intend to order
the further
costs occasioned by the opposition of Stelzer to be paid
by him. I also will order that the Bank should pay the costs for
which
it is liable on the attorney

/and ....

-5-

and client scale. I am satisfied that it has acted
frivolously and contemptuously of the rights of the Applicant, that
its persistent
refusal to allow the Applicant to operate its banking
account is deserving of dis-approval and that it is solely and wholly
responsible
for the necessity for the Applicant to seek an order of
this Court to allow it to operate its account and only after a
considerable
delay occasioned by the conduct of the bank.

The order I will make then is that:

1. 
   The First Respondent is ordered to allow Rose
   Mpho
   Ramabitsa to continue to withdraw Applicant's funds
   held
   by it on behalf of the Applicant.

   
   

2. 
   That the First Respondent is restrained from
   allowing
   Second Respondent to withdraw money deposited with
   the
   First Respondent on behalf of the Applicant.

   
   

3. 
   That the First Respondent shall pay on the attorney
   and
   client scale the costs of this application as an
   unopposed
   application and that the costs of this
   application which have
   been occasioned by the opposition
   of the Second Respondent shall
   be paid by the Second
   Respondent.

   
   

(Sgd)

D. S. LEVY ACTING JUDGE

30th June, 1986

For the Applicant : Mr. Mohau

For the Respondents : Mr. Seotsanyana