Labour Law - Claim for unfair dismissal on the ground of operational requirements (redundancy) of the employer - Appellant challenging both the procedural and substantive aspect of his dismissal - Appellant asking for reinstatement as a principal remedy and compensation in lieu of reinstatement in the event that reinstatement is not possible - Court finding that the dismissal was fair both substantively and procedurally - Court however finding that Appellant is owed statutory severance pay - The dismissal of an employee on the basis of redundancy, after his refusal to accept a secondment from Lesotho to Zimbabwe, is procedurally and substantively unfair, because the legal requirements for dismissal before a fixed term contract expires have not been met. The benefits linked to unfair dismissal must be paid. The appeal is upheld with costs.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF LESOTHO
HELD AT MASERU
C OF A (CIV) 84/2019
In the matter between –
KOALEPE MAKATSELA APPELLANT
ECONET TELECOM LESOTHO RESPONDENT
CORAM: DR K E MOSITO P
DR P MUSONDA AJA
DR J VAN DER WESTHUIZEN AJA
HEARD: 14 APRIL 2021
DELIVERED: 14 MAY 2021
J VAN DER WESTHUIZEN AJA AND K E MOSITO P:
 This is an appeal against a judgment by Moahloli J, with assessors S Makhasane and R Rampa, in the Labour Appeal Court, delivered on 11 November 2019. It deals with the dismissal of Mr. Koalepe Makatsela (the Appellant) by Econet Telecom Lesotho (the Respondent), as well as the benefits paid out to him, after his refusal to accept a secondment from Lesotho to Zimbabwe. The appellant was dismissed on account of redundancy. Unhappy with the dismissal, he referred a claim for unfair dismissal to the Directorate of Dispute Prevention and Resolution (DDPR). The matter was duly conciliated upon but conciliation failed to resolve the issues. It was then referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. The Labour Court heard the matter and, at the end, gave an award that:
 Dissatisfied with part of the above award, the Appellant proceeded to the Labour Appeal Court on appeal against the award. His grounds of appeal before the Labour Appeal Court were that the Labour Court erred in holding:- (i) that there was a need to second the appellant to Zimbabwe, whereas the evidence showed that the Appellant already had all the necessary skills for mobile network and as a result there was no need for his secondment; (ii) that consultation contemplated by the Codes of Good Practice was held, whereas the evidence showed that although there was correspondence in the form of letters and meetings where the issue of secondment was discussed the Appellant was not consulted on the issue of redundancy that led to his dismissal; (iii) that Appellant conceded during cross-examination that severance pay was paid to him, whereas the evidence showed that severance pay as contemplated by statute was not paid to the Appellant; and (iv) that his dismissal was fair both substantively and procedurally, whereas the evidence showed that it was not. The appeal before the Labour Appeal Court was opposed by the Respondent.
 After hearing the appeal, the the Labour Appeal Court held that:
1. The appeal against paragraph 1 of the award of the court a quo is dismissed.
2. The issues of the statutory severance pay and pension payable to the Appellant are referred back to the court a quo for fresh reconsideration of the evidence and arguments, and determination in the light of the remarks of this court.
3. No order is made as to costs.
 Still dissatisfied with the decision of the Labour Appeal Court, the Appellant proceeded to this Court on appeal. It is with that appeal that we are now seized.
 The Appellant, an engineer with qualifications from three universities including Liverpool in the United Kingdom, was an employee of the Respondent. He started as a technician, became a manager in or around 1995 and was appointed as Chief Operating Officer on a three year contract in 2006. With no termination of the contract by either party, a new contract with the same terms came into place in terms of section 65(2) of the Labour Code Order 1992. The Appellant changed departments, but his contract stayed in place.
 In 2008 Telkom Lesotho Ltd and Econet Ezicell Ltd merged. The Appellant remained an employee.
 In January 2010 the Appellant was informed that he was seconded to Zimbabwe. According to him, he went to Zimbabwe in January 2010, but nobody there was aware of his secondment. He returned and met with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Respondent. The Appellant was informed that the Respondent had taken a strategic decision to exchange staff between Lesotho and Zimbabwe. He made it clear that he was not going to Zimbabwe, because he would be worse off contract-wise than he was in Lesotho, as well as because of personal and family circumstances.
 Meetings took place and correspondence was exchanged between employer and employee. The Appellant raised the possibility, if the Respondent insisted on his secondment, “to open negotiations towards severing the relations”. The Chief Human Resources Officer of the Respondent replied that the Appellant’s “refusal to comply with (the decision to second) will be construed as refusal to obey a lawful instruction …; and that he did “not have the mandate to negotiate any severing of relations with you based on your refusal to be seconded to Zimbabwe as instructed …”.
 At some point during their communication the Respondent indicated that there was no other option than to negotiate towards severance of the Appellant’s employment relationship with the Respondent. Further correspondence was exchanged. The dispute was not settled though.
 In September 2010 the Respondent decided to terminate the Appellant’s contract, approximately 18 months before its expiry. He received a letter of dismissal. As indicated above, the Appellant approached the Labour Court (LC) and thereafter the Labour Appeal Court. From the Labour Appeal Court he appealed to this Court.
Appellant’s and Respondent’s cases
 In the LC and Labour Appeal Court, as well as in this Court, the Appellant submitted that his dismissal was substantively and procedurally unfair. He has also been dissatisfied with the pay-out he had received. He sought reinstatement, together with the benefits attached to it. He claimed that, alternatively, he is entitled to the benefits of having been unfairly dismissed. He seeks his statutory severance pay and pension benefits for 1989 to 2006.
 The essence of the Respondent’s case is that since the merger of the companies, strategic, operational and technological changes had to be made. The exchange of staff between Lesotho and Zimbabwe was one of these. The Appellant was seconded to Zimbabwe for skills development.
 According to the Respondent, by refusing to accept the secondment, the Appellant rendered himself redundant. Another person had been appointed in his position. Thus he had to be retrenched with the benefits applicable to severance of the employment relationship.
 The Appellant argues that he needed no skills development as he had passed a skills assessment test in 2009 and had consistently performed beyond his targets. The Respondent argues that new skills had to be developed in Zimbabwe, to suit the new demands of the company.
 The Appellant submits that his contract did not mention secondment. His case is furthermore that his alleged redundancy was used as a pretext. According to him, the Respondent failed to show that his situation fell within the meaning and categories of “redundancy” recognized in labour law. If the Respondent wanted to dismiss him for his failure to obey a lawful instruction, he should have been charged with misconduct and given a proper disciplinary hearing. In the event of dismissal because of redundancy, consultation should have taken place on redundancy. It did not in this case. He and the Respondent consulted about going to Zimbabwe, but not about dismissal on the basis of redundancy.
The Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court
 In the Labour Court Ramoseme ADP found that the Appellant’s dismissal was procedurally and substantively fair. The Respondent was in need of new skills. Consultation did take place before the dismissal. However, the Appellant was owed his pension from the commencement of his employment to the date of the merger; and not only since that date. The court ordered the Respondent to pay M 100 585.16 to the Appellant within 30 days. It made no costs order.
 Section 33AA (2) of the Labour Code Amendment Act 2000 allows for an appeal from the LC to the Labour Appeal Court on questions of law, but not of fact. To some extent the Respondent argued that only questions of fact were at stake. Clearly questions of law were also central in this dispute. The Appellant asked the Labour Appeal Court to set aside the conclusion reached by the Labour Court and substitute its own finding for that of the lower court.
 In paragraph  of its judgment the Labour Appeal Court stated:
“What occurred in casu is the type of retrenchment contemplated in paragraph 19(1) read together with 19(2)(a) and (c) of Labour Code (Code of Good Practice) Notice 2003. It was a dismissal arising from a redundancy caused by the re-organisation of the business for technological reasons as a result of the merger … and the consequential change in the nature of the business.”
 According to the Labour Appeal Court the Appellant was seconded to Zimbabwe to acquire skills to adapt to new technology. It is the prerogative of the Respondent’s CEO and Board to determine what retraining was required; and not for the Appellant to second-guess. The Labour Appeal Court was of opinion that the dismissal was fair.
 As to procedural fairness, consultation prior to dismissal was indeed required, according to the Labour Appeal Court. The court referred to the parts of the correspondence quoted in paragraph  above. It stated that discussions of the terms of separation had taken place, but that the matter had not been “laid to bed”.
 In paragraph  of its judgment the Labour Appeal Court stated:
“In view of all this correspondence and meetings over a period of about nine months, I find it very difficult to agree with Appellant’s contention that he was dismissed without proper consultation.”
 The dismissal was thus not procedurally unfair, according to the Labour Appeal Court.
 On the payment issue, the Labour Appeal Court stated its views in paragraph  of its judgment. These are dealt with below.
 Regarding the award of M 100 585.16 for pension the Labour Appeal Court found that the LC had dealt “with the whole matter in a very cursory manner, without … a full and proper interrogation of the evidence, submissions and applicable law (particularly the legislation regarding the transfer and vesting of the assets and liabilities of the predecessors of the Respondent”.
 The Labour Appeal Court dismissed the appeal against the Labour Court’s conclusion that the dismissal was fair. However, it referred the “issues of the statutory severance pay and pension payable to the Appellant” back to the LC “for fresh reconsideration of the evidence and arguments, and determination in the light of the remarks …” of the Labour Appeal Court. No costs were ordered.
 The questions to be decided include:
(a) Was the Appellant’s dismissal by the Respondent substantively fair?
(b) Was it procedurally fair?
(c) If not, what is the appropriate remedy?
(d) What order, if any, should be made regarding the payments to the Appellant.
On the face of it, the conclusions of the LC and Labour Appeal Court on (a) and (b) look attractive. However, a proper analysis of the applicable law is necessary.
 In terms of section 66(1)(c) of the Labour Code Act 1992 an employee shall not be dismissed, whether adequate notice is given or not, unless there is a valid reason for termination of employment, which reason is based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment, or service. The term “operational requirements” is not defined in the Act. It therefore has to be interpreted, as it is ambiguous. Section 4 of the Act provides:
The following principles shall be used in the interpretation and administration of the Code:
(b) no provision of the Code or of rules and regulations made thereunder shall be interpreted or applied in such a way as to derogate from the provisions of any international labour Convention which has entered into force for the Kingdom of Lesotho;
(c) in case of ambiguity, provisions of the Code and of any rules and regulations made thereunder shall be interpreted in such a way as more closely conforms with provisions of Conventions adopted by the Conference of the International Labour Organisation, and of Recommendations adopted by the Conference of the International Labour Organisation.
(d) where, under the provisions of any other legislation, a person may have a remedy as provided for in that legislation, that remedy shall be in addition to and not in place of any remedy provided for by the Code.
However, in no case may there be double monetary recovery by the same person based on the same set of facts.”
 In Macholo v Lesotho Bakery (Blue Ribbon) Pty Ltd (LAC/A/4/04), in paragraphs 19 to 21 the Labour Appeal Court remarked as follows:
“19. ThereisthereforeneedtoexaminetherelevantprovisionsoftheConventionsadoptedbytheConferenceoftheInternationalLabourOrganisation(I.L.O),andofRecommendationsadopted bytheConferenceoftheI.L.O.Thegeneralprinciplesorguidelinesmentionedintheprecedingparagraphsshouldthereforebebasedoninternationallabournorms,whicharederivedfromI.L.O.RecommendationsandConventions.Thus,astoretrenchments,theI.L.O.Recommendations Nos.119 and 166 and Convention No.158 are of note.It is worth mentioning from the outset that the I.L.O. Recommendation No. 119, has sincebeensupersededbytheI.L.O.RecommendationNo.166anditsConvention.ThetwoRecommendationsarehowevernotinconsistentwitheachother, and to the extent that Recommendation No. 119 has been used as one of the guidinginternationallabourstandardsinretrenchmentmatters,itremainsanimportant instrument.
20. Article13oftheTerminationofEmploymentConvention,(ILOConvention No.158)1982 providesthat, whentheemployercontemplatesterminationsforreasonsofaneconomic,technological,structuralorsimilarnature,theemployershall: (a)providetheworkers'representativesconcernedingoodtimewithrelevant information including the reasons for the terminations contemplated, the number and categories of workers likely to be affected and the period over which theterminationsareintendedtobecarriedout;(b)give,inaccordancewithnationallawandpractice,theworkers'representativesconcerned,asearlyaspossible,anopportunityforconsultationonmeasurestobetakentoavertortotheterminationsandmeasurestomitigatetheadverseeffectsofanyterminations on the workers concerned such as finding alternative employment.
21. Article1ofthisConvention,providesthat,theprovisionsofthisConventionshall,insofarastheyarenototherwisemadeeffectivebymeansofcollectiveagreements, arbitration awards or court decisions or in such other manner as may beconsistentwithnationalpractice,begiveneffectbylawsorregulations.TheviewthatthisCourtholdsthereforeisthat,section4(b)and(c)oftheLabourCodehastheeffectofgivingeffecttotheprovisionsoftheaforementionedConvention.Theapplicabilityofparagraph1ofArticle13ofthisConventionmay however, be limited by the methods of implementation referred to in the said Article,tocasesinwhichthenumberofworkerswhoseterminationofemploymentiscontemplatedisatleastaspecifiednumberorpercentageoftheworkforce.
 In terms of section 7 of the Labour Code (Codes of Good Practice) Notice 2003 (made under section 240 of the Labour Code Order 1992) –
“(1) An employer may dismiss an employee if the employer –
(a) complies with the provisions of the contract;
(b) complies with the provisions of the Labour Code concerning notice and severance pay;
(c) follows a fair procedure; and
(d) has a fair reason for the dismissal.
(2) If an employer has employed an employee on a fixed term contract, the employer may only dismiss the employee before the expiry of the contract period if the employee materially breaches the contract. If there is no breach by the employee, the only way that the employer may terminate the contract lawfully is by getting the employee to agree to early termination.
(3) A material breach means a serious breach that goes to the core of the contract.
(4) The following are examples of conduct that amounts to a material breach of contract of employment: a refusal to work; theft; fraud; gross insubordination, assault on co-employees etc.
(5) The fact that an employer may dismiss an employee before the expiry of the fixed term does not mean that the employer does not have to follow a fair procedure or have a fair reason, although a material breach is more often than not a fair reason to dismiss. It does not mean however that a fair reason is necessarily a material breach. Operational requirements may amount to a fair reason but it does not permit the employer to terminate a fixed term contract early without the agreement of the employee.
(7) Whether the employer dismisses on notice or without notice, the employer must still follow a fair procedure and have a fair reason, although a material breach normally amounts to a fair reason.
(8) Section 63 (1) of the Labour Code prescribes the period of notice that either party must give. An employer and employee may agree to longer notice.
(11) Sections 76 to 79 of the Labour Code regulate matters associated with termination such as severance pay, payment of all outstanding monies and certificates of employment.
(13) A reason is valid if it can be proved. In other words a dismissal will be unfair if the employer is not able to prove the reason for the dismissal. For example, if an employee is dismissed for theft but the employer cannot prove that the employee committed the theft, the dismissal may be unfair.
(14) The burden of proof lies with the employer. It is sufficient for the employer to prove the reason on the balance of probabilities. This means that if there are two opposing versions, the one that is the more probable constitutes proof. Determining which of the contending versions is the more probable depends on the facts led and the inferences drawn from those facts.
(15) A fair reason for dismissing an employee depends on the kind of reason and seriousness of the reason.
(16) Although this list of the kinds of reasons that are normally considered fair is not exhaustive, it is unlikely that a reason other than one of the following will be considered fair: (a) employee misconduct related to employment; (b) employee incapacity, whether performance or health related; (c) the unsuitability of a probationary employee at the expiry of the probationary period; (d) the operational requirements of the business.
(17) The reason must not only be one of the kinds of reasons considered fair but the reason in a particular case must be sufficiently weighty to justify dismissal. (18) There are certain reasons that are considered by the Labour Code to be unfair.They are listed in section 66 and Part XV of the Labour Code.
(19) Before an employer dismisses an employee, the employer must process the dismissal fairly. In principle this means that the employer must - (a) give the reasons for the proposed dismissal to the employee before making the decision to dismiss; (b) give the employee an opportunity to respond to those reasons before making a decision to dismiss; and (c) permit the employee to be represented in the proceedings by a workplace union representative or a co-employee.
(20) These three elements of a fair procedure may be given effect to in different ways. Many collective agreements contain detailed dismissal procedures. Provided that they do not depart from the three elements, compliance with those agreements will constitute compliance with the statutory right to a fair procedure.
(21) The different reasons for dismissal will also call for different kinds of procedures. A fair procedure for dismissing an employee for misconduct may be different from what is fair in respect of dismissing an employee on grounds of incapacity or operational requirements.”
 Redundancy is a species of operational requirements. As the Labour Appeal Court once put it in Standard Lesotho Bank v Morahanye and Another (LAC/CIV/A/06/08) at para11:
The term redundant is not defined anywhere in our pieces of legislation. However, in employment law, an employee is taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if the dismissal is wholly or mainly attributable to: (a) the fact that the employer has ceased, or intends to cease, to carry on the business for the purpose of which the employee was employed by him, or has ceased or intends to cease to carry on that business in the place where the employee was so employed, or (b) the fact that the requirements of that business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind or for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where they were so employed, have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish. See Croner’s Employment Law Bulletin, April 1994, at D160. According to this definition, an employer must be able to show that: (i) the business has ceased or diminished either permanently or temporarily or intends to cease or diminish; (ii) the employee cannot perform the work at the place where s/he was so employed; (iii) requirements of the business for the employee to carry out work of a particular kind have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish;(iv) the employee was supposed to perform work of a particular kind which must cease or diminish or expected to cease or diminish.
 If the Appellant were dismissed on account of operational requirements (in the nature of redundancy) , then the proper consultation ought to have been in line with the provisions of the Act, ILO Conventions and the Codes of Good Practice outlined above on redundancy as defined above.
Application of the law
Substantively and procedurally unfair
 In the present appeal, if the employer contemplated a dismissal on account of redundancy, then, firstly, it must have given the employee an opportunity for consultation on measures to be taken to avert or to the terminations and measures to mitigate the adverse effects of any termination on the employee concerned such as the effect of the contemplated termination on the remaining period of his fixed term contract as well as his terminal benefits.
 Secondly, section 69 of the Act states:
“Written statements of reasons for dismissal
(1) The employer shall provide a written statement of the reason for dismissal, as defined in section 68(a) and (b), to any employee who is dismissed. Such statement shall be given to the employee either before dismissal, at the time of dismissal or within four weeks of the dismissal having taken effect.
(2) Every such written statement shall be admissible in evidence in legal proceedings.
(3) In the absence of a reasonable excuse, an employer will not be permitted in legal proceedings to contradict the statement he or she has given to the employee in accordance with subsection (1).
(4) It shall be an offence punishable with a fine not exceeding three hundred maloti for an employer, in the absence of reasonable excuse, to fail to give an employee the written statement referred to in subsection (1) above….”
 According to the written statement of the reason for dismissal in this appeal, the employer dismissed the employee on account of “redundancy”, not for breach of contract. The legal position as indicated above is that the employer could only dismiss the employee before the expiry of the fixed-term contract period, if the employee materially breached the contract. In this kind of case, and in labour law, the only way that the employer may terminate the contract lawfully is by getting the employee to agree to early termination. On the facts on record, this was not done.
 The last issue on the procedural and substantive fairness in this appeal was that, all along, the interaction (the so-called “consultation”) was on secondment and not on redundancy. We agree with the learned judge’s remarks that, if an employee unreasonably refuses to retrain and the employer can demonstrate that the retraining is essential either to improve the employee’s performance, or to meet business requirements, then an employer may have no option but to dismiss. However, prior to the dismissal, the employer must consult the employee on the contemplated reason for dismissal. The appellant was never consulted on redundancy. He was “consulted” on secondment and yet dismissed on redundancy. In fact, in its judgment, the LC commented: “Regarding consultations, evidence has shown that there were meetings and correspondence in the form of letters where both the secondment and termination were discussed.”
 This was substantively and procedurally unfair. The importance of nullifying the dismissal is that the employee would entitled to be paid for the remaining period of his contract. He would therefore not be reinstated but compensated in salary for the remaining period of his employment as well as fringe benefits and terminal benefits
Remittal of the case by the Labour Appeal Court
 The next issue is about severance and pension. The Labour Appeal Court held in paragraph  of its judgment:
“As far as Makatsela’s claim to statutory severance pay is concerned, it seems clear from the Record of Proceedings that whereas he accepted thathewaspaidalongserviceawardorseparationpayamountingto M420030.00, he insisted that this was not the statutory severance pay he expected (of M678510.00) for 21 years of serviceat the monthly rate payable at the time of termination (i.e. M70005.00)17.In my view the Acting Deputy President consequently erred in finding that during cross examination Makatsela conceded that he was paid his statutory severance pay upon termination of his service.
Regarding theawardofM100585-16forpension,Ifindthatthe courtof aquo dealtwiththewholematterinaverycursorymanner, withoutmakingafullandproperinterrogationofthe evidence, submissions and applicable law(particularly the legislation regarding the transfer and vesting of the assets and liabilities of the predecessors of the Respondent).”
 As stated in paragraph  above, the Labour Appeal Court ordered:
(2) The issues of the statutory severance pay and pension payable to the Appellant are referred back to the court a quo for fresh reconsideration oftheevidenceandarguments, anddeterminationinthelightofthe remarks of this court.
 The Labour Court decided:
“About the severance payment claim, we confirm that during cross examination, Applicant conceded that it was paid. However, what has not been disputed is the payment of Applicant’s pension from 1989 to 2008. This thus means that Respondent accepts it as claimed. We are persuaded by the authority in Standard Lesotho Bank v Morahanye (supra) to this view.”
 Both the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court appear to have confused separation package with statutory severance pay. The appellant was talking about the latter while the two courts appear to have been talking about the separation package having been received. However, the Labour Court made a clear finding that, “what has not been disputed is the payment of Applicant’s pension from 1989 to 2008. This thus means that Respondent accepts it as claimed. We are persuaded by the authority in Standard Lesotho Bank v Morahanye (supra) to this view.” The Labour Court proceeded to make an award in ordering the Respondent to pay Applicant his pension in the sum of M100, 585-16, within 30 days.
 The Labour Court is functus officio in respect of severance pay and pension. The Labour Appeal Court abdicated its responsibility by remitting the matter to the Labour Court to finalise the issues of the statutory severance pay and pension payable to the Appellant “for fresh reconsideration of the evidence and arguments, and determination in the light of the remarks of this court.” Since the full record of proceedings was before the Labour Appeal Court, there was no reason for it to have remitted the matter to a court which had already determined the issues.
 Based on the above, the appeal must succeed with costs. In his prayers contained in the Originating Application before the LC the Appellant sought the following award:–
 At this stage it would be impracticable to order the reinstatement of the Appellant in the employ of the Respondent. During the hearing of oral argument counsel for the Appellant submitted that this Court must order that the dismissal was procedurally and substantively unfair; and order the payment of all due benefits. She also argued that the Appellant must be compensated for the remaining months of his contract, as well as his severance payments and his pension from 1989 to 2006 as he was absorbed when the merger took place. She referred this Court to a letter dated 21 September 2010, from the Respondent to the Appellant. In this letter the Respondent confirmed that it had “affected payment of (his) termination benefits … “namely “ 33 leave days … September 2010 salary… (and) 6 months’ salary”, to the total of M 595 042.50.
 Given the above discussions, there was enough evidence for the Labour Court to issue a declaratory order that the appellant’s dismissal was both procedurally and substantively unfair. Given that the fixed term contract has expired, it would be impracticable to reinstate the appellant. The Labour Court had sufficient evidence to direct the respondent to pay to the appellant all the residual salaries in the contract, including all fringe benefits and bonuses as well as appellant’s pension monies. This being a matter of unfair dismissal, the Labour Court would not order costs against the Respondent.
 In view of the above, the following is ordered:
(a) The appeal is upheld.
(b) The order of the Labour Appeal Court is set aside and replaced by the following:
(i) The appeal is upheld.
(ii) It is declared that the dismissal of the Appellant by the Respondent was procedurally and substantively unfair.
(iii) The Respondent must within 30 days pay to the Appellant,
(iv) The Respondent must pay the costs of the application before the Labour Court and the appeal before the Labour Appeal Court.
(d) The Respondent must pay the costs of this appeal.
DR J VAN DER WESTHUIZEN
ACTING JUSTICE OF APPEAL
DR K E MOSITO
PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL
DR P MUSONDA
FOR APPELLANT: ADV. NB PHEKO
FOR RESPONDENT: MR. Q LETSIKA
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