HIGH COURT OF LESOTHO
matter of :
by the Hon. Acting Mr. Justice D.S, Levy on the 6th November, 1985.
matter Plaintiff whose claim is for ejectment of the Defendant
from certain premises and payment of arrear rentals
M3,000 takes exception to the Defendant's plea that it does not
disclose a defence.
admitted allegations made by the Plaintiff are as follows :
Plaintiff is the lawful owner and occupier of site 619 Hillsview.
Defendant was called upon by Lesotho Building Finance Corporation.
(L.B.F.C.) to. vacate the premises.
Defendant was informed by L.B.F.C. "that it had decided to hand
over its rights and obligations under (an agreement of
L.B.F.C. and certain AGTEC (Pty) Ltd)" (AGTEC).
Defendant is in occupation of the premises..
Defendant did not deny a further allegation by the Plaintiff that
this agreement of lease has expired
therefore presumed to have admitted it.
remaining allegations made by the Plaintiff having been denied, or
not having been admitted, by the Defendant the issues that
between the parties on the pleadings are :
L.B.F.C. acted as agent for the Plaintiff in entering into a written
agreement of lease of the premises of which the Plaintiff
such lease was for a period of 24 months.
the Plaintiff leased the premises to AGTEC in terms of a written
agreement or whether Plaintiff leased the premises to
a certain Peacock Garment Company (Pty) Ltd (Peacock) in terms of an
oral agreement as alleged by the Defendant.
such oral agreement is for an indefinite period.
of the Defendant's version of the agreement of lease to be culled
from the pleadings is that Defendant claims that his
occupation arises out of an oral agreement for the lease of these
premises to Peacock by Plaintiff for an indefinite period
and that he
does not derive his right from any agreement of lease between
Plaintiff and AGTEC which may or may not have expired.
analysis of the pleadings it is apparent that the Defendant's plea
does disclose a defence to the action for ejectment.
discloses the defence that Peacock and not the Plaintiff (who is its
managing director) is liable for the rent due under
the lease since
he is not a party to it nor is he in unlawful occupation (and so
liable for damages) until the
been lawfully terminated by notice duly given. The allegation by the
Plaintiff that he told the Defendant to vacate the
premises does not
amount to such a notice.
Plaintiff's further exception to the plea is that the lease between
Plaintiff and Peacock on which he relies for his right to
occupation was alleged by him to be timeless in its duration and so
is a nullity under the provisions of section 26 of
the Deeds Registry
Act 12 of 1967. I am of the view that the word 'timeless' as used by
the Defendant to describe the lease was
not intended to convey the
allegation that the lease was for ever but merely to allege that no
period was fixed for its duration
so that it would amount to no more
than a monthly tenancy.
exceptions accordingly are dismissed with costs.
Plaintiff : Mr. Pheko
Defendant : Mr. Gwentshe.
African Law (AfricanLII)
Ghana Law (GhaLII)
Laws of South Africa (Legislation)
Lesotho Law (LesLII)
Liberian Law (LiberLII)
Malawian Law (MalawiLII)
Namibian Law (NamibLII)
Nigerian Law (NigeriaLII)
Sierra Leone Law (SierraLII)
South African Law (SAFLII)
Seychelles Law (SeyLII)
Swaziland Law (SwaziLII)
Tanzania Law (TanzLII)
Ugandan Law (ULII)
Zambian Law (ZamLII)
Zimbabwean Law (ZimLII)
Commonwealth Countries' Law
LII of India
United States Law