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Cited documents 2
Act
1Judgment
1
SUMMARY
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Application to have section 98(4) of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act no.40 of 2008 declared unconstitutional for violating section 12 of the Constitution, in that it permits the concurrent running of criminal and civil proceedings in respect of the same property seized in terms of it- she had argued that, given this scenario, it forces her to disclose her defence in civil proceedings thereby forcing her to waive her right to self-incrimination with the consequence that her pending criminal trial is prejudiced- Held, this section does not force an applicant faced with forfeiture application to incriminate herself, what it rather does is to leave her with the choice between leaving forfeiture application go unchallenged and substantively responding to it, held that for this reason, this section is constitutional.
-The applicant had further sought to have a three-year delay to charge her with criminal offences following her suspension from work, violated her right to be tried within a reasonable time in terms of section 12 of the Constitution, Held, pre-charge delay in preferring charges not protected by the right to speedy trial a provided under section 12 of the Constitution, the reckoning of time within which a person must be tried starts after charges have been read not before.
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Documents citing this one 3
Judgment
3
Summary
Recusal application – prosecutor absenting himself from court proceedings without leave of court and attends to another case without knowledge of court – application for postponement filed by the DPP because of absence of prosecutor – misleading information placed before court in support of such application – prosecutor being the source of such information – another prosecutor appointed – previous prosecutor disqualified from appearing in the case – remarks disapproving manner in which the Crown counsel conducted himself – whether the disqualification of the prosecutor and remarks made in course of proceedings constitute reasonable apprehension of bias – ethical obligations of prosecutors – Speedy Court Trials Act, 2002, sections 5(1), 9(4) and 12(4)
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SUMMARY
During criminal proceedings preceding the actual trial of accused most of who have been in custody for about four years, thereby giving cause for the trial to commence and proceed with reasonable speed and in light of several postponements, presiding judge, the Honourable Chief Justice conducting an inquiry in terms of s 12(4)(b) and (c) of the Speedy Court Trials Act 2002 (No. 9 of 2002)and finding lead prosecution counsel guilty of transgressions under said section and excluding him from further appearing in case;
Crown, through Director of Public Prosecutions, being aggrieved by the conduct of the proceedings to that stage and by the exclusion of lead counsel filing for recusal of presiding judge;
Presiding judge declining to recuse himself and Director of Public Prosecutions appealing against decision excluding lead prosecution counsel and decision declining recusal;
On appeal: Held presiding judge erred in applying provisions of Speedy Court Trials Act and excluding lead prosecution counsel; Held further on facts and circumstances of case before him, presiding judge should have recused himself;
Also raised on appeal - that the trial of the accused be assigned to a foreign judge consequent upon earlier decision of Government and Judicial Service Commission that trial of accused and others in high-profile and sensitive cases be assigned to foreign judges appointed for that purpose;
Appeal Court, noting that a number of such cases have already been assigned to local judges, declines to order that case be allocated only to a foreign judge and leaves decision to relevant authorities as to which judge to preside;
Appeal by Director of Public Prosecutions upheld on basis presiding judge erred in decision under Speedy Court Trials Act and in refusing to recuse himself, and directing that matter be placed before another judge, foreign or local, as may be decided
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